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the official position of MORS. Omissions and
errors in fact are corrected when possible, but
every effort is made to present the interviewee’s
own words.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Vernon M. Bettencourt, Jr. was
MORS President 1991–1992 and was
elected a MORS Fellow in 1998 and Wanner
Laureate in 2005. Mr. Bettencourt was the
Director of Analysis and Chief Information
Officer for the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3,
(DCS, G-3) HQDA from 1999 until his ap-
pointment as the Deputy Chief Information
Officer/G-6, US Army, in 2003. This inter-
view was conducted on two separate occa-
sions in the Pentagon, Army G-6 office:
October 11, 2005 and November 22, 2005.
BOB SHELDON: It’s October 11th,
2005. We’re at Vern Bettencourt’s office in
the Pentagon. First of all, state where you
were born.
VERN BETTENCOURT: I was born in
Ventura, California in October 1947.
BOB SHELDON: Give us your par-
ents’ names and how they might have in-
fluenced you in your career and education.
VERN BETTENCOURT: My dad’s
name was Vernon M. Bettencourt. My
mother is Eunice E. Bettencourt. They were
both high school graduates. My dad was a
junior college graduate.
I have one sister. My parents were both
very keen that we receive college educa-
tions, so that was number one. About the
beginning of high school I began to aim
towards attending a military academy. So
they were careful to talk to some friends
who were educators, and helped on the
selection of high school electives, et cetera,
that would point towards an academy and
an engineering degree. I can still remember
the amount of help my mother gave me in
proofing papers. So I would say they were
pretty influential.
BOB SHELDON: Where did you go to
high school?
VERN BETTENCOURT: San Marcos
High School in Santa Barbara, California.
BOB SHELDON: Did you take an in-
terest in mathematics or science in high
school?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I took the ad-
vanced mathematics and science curricu-
lum at high school and ended up with first
semester calculus in high school. I was in-
terested in science in high school, but my
real interest was attending one of the mili-
tary academies and the math and science
piece were prerequisites. Extracurricular
activities such as Scouting and Key Club
were also preparation. Boy Scouts and Ex-
plorers were a great personal and organi-
zational leadership opportunity that I re-
ally enjoyed. I ended up as the head of all
Eagle Scouts and Explorers in our county.
Heady stuff for a 16-year-old.
BOB SHELDON: How did you choose
your military academy? Did you apply to
all of them?
VERN BETTENCOURT: It was medi-
cally chosen. My dad flew B-24s in World
War II. He was an Army Air Corps pilot—
not Air Force. So I aspired to attend the Air
Force Academy, but my vision wasn’t suf-
ficient.
BOB SHELDON: What Theatre did he
fly in?
VERN BETTENCOURT: He flew in
the European Theatre with the 15th Air
Force, initially out of North Africa, and
then out of southern Italy. Stephen Am-
brose wrote a book about that—The Wild
Blue: The Men and Boys Who Flew the B-24s
Over Germany 1944–45. George McGovern
was in it as a B-24 pilot. That group was my
dad’s group. He often talked about combat
but I didn’t appreciate what he had been
through until I read the book and served in
Vietnam. Aircrews had the highest attrition
in WWII.
BOB SHELDON: So you chose West
Point as a fallback?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Because of
my vision. I couldn’t get into the Air Force
Academy, and my Congressman suggested
that I apply for West Point. Which I did.
BOB SHELDON: Did you take any
prep school or did your high school ade-
quately prepare you?
VERN BETTENCOURT: No. It was
high school. I ended up as the first alternate
for West Point from my Congressman. I
was ready to go to the University of Cali-
fornia at Santa Barbara in electrical engi-
neering as a major. I was lying in bed on the
morning of the last day of June of 1965 and
the phone rang. It was the Congressman’s
office saying, “Can you be at West Point
not later than noon tomorrow?” Just like
Stonewall Jackson—except for the phone.
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The primary candidate had received a four-
year full scholarship to Yale. He decided he’d
rather do that than go to West Point and then to
Vietnam. So he mailed his rejection back. In
those days, from California to Washington,
D.C., took about 10–12 days for a letter to get
here, so they must have gotten it the day before.
They called and I was literally speechless. My
dad said, “Yes, we’ll get him there.” So I flew
all night and got to New York and up to West
Point. There was one lady in the administrative
building that knew I was supposed to be there.
She gave me a 35 card with her name and
phone number, and she said, “Show this to all
the upper classmen, because none of them will
know you’re suppose to be here.” So every-
where I went, I showed this card. And they
said, “Okay.” But then I had to move compa-
nies, and I was always a week behind every-
body else from starting out late.
BOB SHELDON: Any strong remem-
brances of your West Point years? Good or bad.
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, I met my
wife there, so that’s a very strong remem-
brance. (Laughing) She is still with me today.
She attended Ladycliff College, which is right
down the road from West Point. We met her
freshman year, my sophomore year. I was 18;
she was 17. Having watched my daughters at
that age, I can’t believe that we decided at that
point that we were the ones for each other.
It seems like cadets and middies are di-
vided on military academies. Either they really
enjoy it, and try to adhere to the system; or they
enjoy it, but try to get around the system. Or
they just don’t enjoy it. I was one that enjoyed
it and tried to work with the system. It was, for
me, a great four years. It was during the Viet-
nam era, so we were removed, if not ostracized,
from our peer group for being in a military
academy. Certainly back in coastal southern
California—that was not exactly a popular ca-
reer choice at the time. But I’m very glad that I
did it.
Let me expand on this a little. I still have a
periodic sense of wonder that I actually became
a West Point Cadet, let alone graduate. That
early morning phone call was clearly the “Tip-
ping Point” of my life. All else follows from
that: my marriage and daughters, and now
granddaughter, my profession and career, and
my values. I read Steven Covey on effective
leadership. He talks about personal values and
mission. For me that is straight forward: God,
Family, Duty, Honor, Country. All since has
been focused on attempting to live those val-
ues. West Point taught me that. It also gave me
a great military and engineering education, as
well as a leadership testing ground. I was for-
tunate enough to command Company D-2 the
last two of three cadet details Firstie Year. What
a tremendous learning experience.
BOB SHELDON: Did you select a branch
and get what you wanted?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. I was high
enough in the class that I was able to choose the
branch that I wanted. I don’t think they do it
anymore, but when I was there, between our
junior and our senior year, in the summer, we
would take a tour of the major TRADOC
schools for the branches that we could go at the
time. The five combat arms. We’d go to each of
those schools and they’d put on demonstra-
tions, and we’d learn what it was to be an
officer in that branch. When we went to Fort
Sill, one of the things they did was take us out
to the direct fire range where we conducted
direct fire with 105mm Howitzers against car
bodies. I was the gunner, and we were firing at
a yellow Volkswagen. I can still see it in the
scope. We got a direct hit. The door flew about
100 feet up in the air (Laughing) and I said this
is all right. This might be a good way to go. So
I chose Field Artillery.
I thought that it would be good to get a
little seasoning before I went to Vietnam, so I
chose Germany for a first tour.
BOB SHELDON: Back to the academy. Did
you feel adequately trained academically in
your math and science when you later took
some more advanced courses? Or do you wish
you’d studied harder and did more?
VERN BETTENCOURT: At the time, you
were only allowed two electives and I took
social science electives. But we still had a pretty
rich engineering and math science background
in the core curriculum. In engineering I cer-
tainly did and in science I did. The method of
instruction in the mathematics has changed a
little bit. When we were there, it was more
about memorizing theorems and corollaries
and proofs. And being able to write and recite
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those in class when you were studying calculus
than it was about understanding what was re-
ally going on in the calculus. So that was lack-
ing in the curriculum. When I got to Georgia
Tech in grad school and took the first quarter
summer refresher courses, that was the first
time I really understood what calculus was all
about. Because they take the applied view
down there. In the curriculum at Georgia Tech,
we did have a math proof course and a math
logic course. So we did get that. But the calcu-
lus was applied calculus, and that’s where I
really learned what calculus was all about.
BOB SHELDON: Back to being a young
artillery officer in Germany, where was that?
VERN BETTENCOURT: In Zirndorf, Ger-
many which was just outside of Nuremburg.
With the 4th Armored Division first, and then it
was reflagged to the 1st Armored Division.
BOB SHELDON: Did you do maneuvers
close to the wall with East Germany?
VERN BETTENCOURT: You mean the
border with Czechoslovakia. We did have
emergency defense positions up on the border
with Czechoslovakia. We were opposite
Czechoslovakia, down in Nuremburg. We had
positions there and then of course, Grafen-
woehr where we used to go to fire was up near
the Czechoslovakia border, also. One of the
ironic issues—we would do that during the
day, and then on the weekend when you’d go
to the commissary, and you’d go to the meat
department, a lot of the beef was from Czecho-
slovakia. (Laughing) Even though we were fac-
ing them as enemies, capitalism still applied.
PETE DAVIDSON: Was the reflagging
part of an Army reorganization? Were they
pulling back troops?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I believe that was
just part of a reorganization in Army flags.
There may have been a little bit of a downsiz-
ing. This was in late 1970, early 1971, that we
reflagged. That may have been the beginning of
the tail off of Vietnam. We didn’t pull anybody
out of Germany. I know that. But as a First
Lieutenant, all that was echelons above my re-
ality at the time.
BOB SHELDON: Were you involved in
REFORGER (REturn of FORces to GERmany)
exercises?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, there were
REFORGERs. We participated in those. With
the artillery, if you’re an artillery lieutenant,
when the maneuver arms go out to the field,
you went out with them as fire support team
leaders or forward observers. Then when you
went to the field to fire—we usually fired twice
a year with our cannon. Then you go to the
field for a month at that point. So we were gone
a lot when we were over there. I’ve often
thought about the fact that artillery—between
the use of computers and mathematics, and the
fact that artillery supports the maneuver arms,
that’s pretty good preparation for operations
research in the Army, because of the combined
arms view you receive. In one I was a controller
for a division in which GB George Patton III
was Assistant Division Commander. Of course,
the main command post was “destroyed” so
command went to Patton at the Alternate TOC
with me telling him what he was or was not
allowed to do. That was an experience!
BOB SHELDON: Did you have some close
encounters with your Cold War enemies?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We would go out
on recons for our emergency deployment exer-
cises, and the officers would go forward to the
border and recon our actual positions. At that
point we did see them. At that time the artillery
was nuclear-capable, so I was in the Personnel
Reliability Program as part of the nuclear pro-
gram. It was difficult to travel to Berlin if you
were in the program so I never did that.
BOB SHELDON: Did your family enjoy
living in Germany?
VERN BETTENCOURT: My wife really
enjoyed it. Our first daughter was born over
there. When I took command of my battery, I
had a First Sergeant Jim Jones, and his wife was
Gerda Jones who was a German, and the both
of them were just tremendous people. Let there
be no doubt that the fundamental strength and
glue of our Army is the NCO Corps. It was a
strange relationship because during the day, I
was the Battery Commander; he was the First
Sergeant. It was proper and respectful. But then
at night or on the weekends, particularly after
our daughter was born, we were new parents,
and our parents were back in the states. So Jim
and Gerda were the surrogate grandparents for
our daughter.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. VERNON M. BETTENCOURT JR., FS
Military Operations Research, V13 N3 2008 Page 3
His oldest daughter was about two years
younger than my wife, so it even fit chronolog-
ically. Randy had a good time with Gerda, and
they did a lot of good for the Battery. Both of
them were very involved in the life of the junior
enlisted in the Battery, and tried to help them,
because times were economically tough for the
junior enlisted. They did a lot of work with
food stores and all that kind of stuff with the
junior enlisted. We also got to tour in the Ba-
varian area, and down into Austria and Italy.
We enjoyed that.
BOB SHELDON: Was it a two-year assign-
ment?
VERN BETTENCOURT: It ended up being
2 1⁄2 years. I volunteered to go to Vietnam. I was
in command so I would have finished out the
three-year tour otherwise. I commanded for
about 14 months.
BOB SHELDON: Where did you go to in
Vietnam?
VERN BETTENCOURT: By the time I got
there, there really weren’t many U.S. units ex-
cept for some aviation units. I was a district
senior advisor down in the Mekong Delta for a
Vietnamese Infantry Major who was the district
chief.
BOB SHELDON: What kinds of advice did
you give him?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We had some ar-
tillery down there and U.S. helicopters and Tac
Air support so I was able to help. We also had
the Vietnamese artillery. I was certainly able to
help with Vietnamese artillery. A lot of it was
coordinating U.S.—these days we’d call it sta-
bility support or nation-building—building
schools, water wells, canals. So a lot of it was
the support resources that we could bring.
Mainly funds from our regional commanders.
We also helped them with communications.
Ironically, that’s what I’m doing now. We par-
ticipated in patrols with them, but by that time,
they were very skilled in patrolling. So there
wasn’t a lot of help that we could give them in
tactics, but we could give them fire support and
resources.
BOB SHELDON: Did you come under fire
while you were there?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. A couple
times we did. Both on patrols and in Base
Camp. One Base Camp battle was an all night
affair. What we were able to do is bring in U.S.
artillery and air. There wasn’t much U.S. artil-
lery, so the main thing we had to offer was
either Air Force or Army attack helicopter air.
We could bring that in for them, but infantry
tactic-wise, they were in good shape by that
time. This was 1972–73.
BOB SHELDON: How much time did you
spend there?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I spent five
months over there, and then war ended and I
came home.
BOB SHELDON: Were you one of the last
ones to pull out?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. I came out in
April 1973 as we were shutting down the dis-
tricts and the regions at that point.
BOB SHELDON: Was your withdrawal
chaotic?
VERN BETTENCOURT: No. We got out
before that happened up in Saigon. The main
thrust of the North Vietnamese was coming in
the central highlands in the north towards
Saigon, and we were in the delta below any of
that. So no, it wasn’t chaotic.
BOB SHELDON: What was your next as-
signment?
VERN BETTENCOURT: After Vietnam,
the military personnel center really didn’t
know what to do with all of us that were com-
ing back. The most expedient thing they could
do was dump us all into the advanced course.
In early to mid 1973, at Fort Sill there were
several advanced courses. I think there were
four of them that were going on simulta-
neously. Usually there’s two in session. But at
this point there were four because they had
such a class load from the people coming back
from Vietnam, plus the ones that had been
scheduled to come normally. At the time the
advanced course was nine months long. That
gave the personnel system time to adjust as to
where to put all these people.
BOB SHELDON: The advanced course
that you took, that was artillery?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. That was ar-
tillery. But pertinent to our discussion here to-
day, what they had—which I don’t believe they
have now—were electives. The first six months
were pretty artillery intensive. Then the last
three months you took electives. I had two or
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three electives, and I took Operations Research
electives. That was my introduction to Opera-
tions Research, in the electives of the advanced
course.
BOB SHELDON: What topics did you
cover in those courses?
VERN BETTENCOURT: There were cer-
tainly elementary probability and statistics, lin-
ear programming, and there was also some cost
analysis, net present value and macro-eco-
nomic analysis. As I was taking these courses, I
began to get interested in the discipline so I
talked to the instructors. A couple of them were
fellow artillery captains and then there was the
head ORSA guy in the instructional part of the
school who was a Major.
I asked, “Is there much math involved in
this?” And they said, “There’s a little math, but
basically you take a lot of management science
type courses.” I think all of them had been to
Georgia Tech. I was interested in getting an
MBA degree at the time, and I talked to Branch.
Branch, which was the military personnel peo-
ple, was interested in sending people to grad-
uate school because again, that was a way to
prolong this big bubble of people that had re-
turned from Vietnam. It was also a way to get a
bunch of officers with advanced degrees. So
they were pretty amenable to people going out
of the advanced course to grad school. I called
Branch and said, “I’m interested in an MBA.”
They said, “Absolutely not. People go at night
and weekends and get those. We don’t need
any MBAs.” I said, “What’s the closest I can get
to that?” They said, “Operations Research.”
And I said, “Okay.”
So I talked to these instructors. In fact,
that’s what caused me to take those electives, to
find out more about what this was. The instruc-
tors said, “You take a couple of math courses,
but mainly you take business and management
courses.” So I said, “That sounds pretty good.”
Then I began to take the electives and I was
enjoying those. So I called Branch back and said
I would be interested in an ORSA curriculum. I
said, “Where are the schools?” And they said,
“There’s the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, there’s Tulane, and
there’s Georgia Tech.” And there were a couple
others, but those were the main ones. I said I’d
be really interested in that Monterey school
because I’m from California. And they said,
“Okay.”
I heard nothing for a couple months, and
then I got this big thick packet in the mail from
Georgia Tech. I opened it and there was an
example curriculum with six or seven courses
in the Mathematics Department. To include
math logic, which was a graduate level course,
and a bunch of other math courses. Probability
and statistics, calculus, et cetera. I took this
packet over to the instructors and said, “What
is this? You said not much math.” (Laughing)
They looked at it and said, “They signed you
up for ORSA engineering. We took ORSA busi-
ness.” In the Army there were two disciplines of
ORSA. There was business—which is mainly
economic analysis. And engineering, which
was the operational effectiveness piece.
There was another guy in the advanced
course—Steve Pryplesh, who’s now a retired
Colonel. He was in the advanced course prior
to me, but it was only a two or three-week
offset, because we’re all there together. He was
from northern Virginia, so he signed up for
Georgia Tech to be close to home, and he got
sent to Monterey. (Laughing)
So the Army in its wisdom gave us our
assignments. That’s how I ended up in an
ORSA program.
PETE DAVIDSON: At this time it was
ORSA—it was still just a specialty code? So
you’re an artillery guy with this extra skill?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. It was not a
functional area 49. It was a specialty code. We
still did the dual tracking at that point.
PETE DAVIDSON: So when you got out
of grad school, the idea was you’d go some-
where and do ORSA work to pay back for your
education.
VERN BETTENCOURT: Right. You went
to graduate school for two years and then you
had a three-year ORSA utilization tour. From
there you’d usually go back to your Branch, in
my case field artillery. But my utilization tour
ended up being back at Fort Sill, in combat
development. So that keeps you with your
Branch. I think that was a good thing to go back
there and do artillery-related analysis. I
thought it worked out pretty well doing it that
way. Because you stay current and known in
your Branch—number one. And number two,
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you’re working on the future of your Branch.
So that when you’re ready to go back to the
Branch, in that three-year tour when you’re
serving in the Branch, you will begin to expe-
rience some of the things that you were doing
the analysis of. Plus doing Operations Research
Analysis you learned a heck of a lot about
artillery tactics and capabilities, and organiza-
tions. And also the maneuver capabilities and
organizations, as you did the combat models.
So I thought that was a pretty good assignment
for a new artillery ORSA.
PETE DAVIDSON: Did the courses you
took at Georgia Tech apply to the models and
things you were building? Monterey has its
own special military OR courses but I know
Georgia Tech does not. How did those two play
together?
VERN BETTENCOURT: There was a guy
there, a retired Army Colonel, Griff Callaghan.
He was the daddy for all of us that were there.
At the time the Army was investing pretty
heavily in graduate education. And at the time
I was there, there were at least 50 or 60 Army
officers and about 30 of them were in ORSA.
Griff Callaghan tried to arrange the curriculum
so that there would be some military examples
and case studies in the curriculum. Of the 30
Army ORSAs, I think 10 were in the Manage-
ment Science Department and 20 of us were in
the Industrial Engineering Department. We
took modeling and simulation, but it was more
related to industrial applications than it was to
military. One of the things that Griff did was
try and arrange for thesis topics that were mil-
itary topics, where we could apply Operations
Research techniques and theory to a military
problem for our thesis. We had the thesis, but
effectively it was about a semester of work,
spread over two or three quarters. Ironically it
turned out the sponsor of my thesis was the
Operational Test and Evaluation Agency Tech-
nical Director, Walt Hollis!
BOB SHELDON: Was Griff Callaghan on
the faculty?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. He was one
of the professors in industrial engineering.
Now he’s a Professor Emeritus; he’s getting
pretty senior now. He obviously doesn’t teach
anymore. But I got there in December of 1973,
so this was a while ago. (Note: He passed away
in 2006.)
BOB SHELDON: Any other notable pro-
fessors you remember from Georgia Tech?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Douglas Mont-
gomery who wrote a lot of books in modeling
and simulation. He also did some response
surface work. I did my thesis in response
surfaces, and he was my advisor. J. J. Jarvis
did a lot at Georgia Tech and was very active in
INFORMS. Ron Johnson did linear program-
ming. Those are the three that I remember. Plus
Griff Callaghan.
BOB SHELDON: E. B. Vandiver men-
tioned Griff.
VERN BETTENCOURT: That would have
been in the same context in the education of
some ORSA officers that went to the Center for
Army Analysis (CAA).
BOB SHELDON: Going to Fort Sill for
your next duty assignment. What were some of
the early problems you worked on as an ORSA?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I went to Fort Sill
and they had a pool of ORSAs in the combat
development Branch that worked on what was
called the ‘legal mix’ series, and where the ‘le-
gal’ came from I don’t know. But the mix was
the force structure of artillery. This was a pre-
pre-QDR look at the force structure of the ar-
tillery force. That was the legal mix series, and
I think we’re up to legal mix five or six by now.
BOB SHELDON: Is it still called that?
VERN BETTENCOURT: No. It’s not called
that officially, but to this day, if they want to do
an artillery mix study, people will say we need
a legal mix like study. The terminology is still
around. It’s not the official title. The head of
Combat Developments was Colonel “Bulldog”
Drummond who later became a two-star gen-
eral and headed both TRADOC Combat Devel-
opments and later OTEA. Lieutenant Colonel
Ron Renfro was the head ORSA out there and
there were a bunch of people under him. Steve
Pryplesh, who I mentioned earlier, was one. Joe
Antonetti, who is an analyst with Lockheed. Al
Resnick—he took my place down at TRADOC
as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Com-
bat Development, and he’s still down there. So
there was some very good ORSA talent there.
I was assigned to the TRADOC Systems
Manager (TSM) for Remotely-Piloted Vehicles
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(RPVs). It was a new office that was just form-
ing when I got there, and was, in fact, the first
TSM office to stand up. I was assigned as an
analyst for that office in January of 1976. That
became the Aquila RPV which was never
fielded, but served as a trailblazer for the UAVs
the Army has now. The major analysis effort of
the office was a cost and operational effective-
ness analysis on the RPV. This was the initial
study done on this type of capability. Today we
would call it a capabilities analysis more than a
COEA. We ended up with several alternatives
among the RPVs, and we had three different
capabilities of RPVs that we looked at in the
study to try and see which mix of these capa-
bilities would improve the combat effectiveness
of our Army formations the most.
That was the main effort and there was a lot
of work involved since it was a new capability.
We had to develop the doctrine, the Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), the mission
profiles, the data, and the models. There wasn’t
a model that represented an RPV, or I guess I
should say not well. If you used the DMSO
definition of simulation, which is a method for
implementing a model over time, it was a
model. One of the biggest issues we had was
how do I model an RPV?
BOB SHELDON: How did you model it?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We modeled it
pretty much as an airborne sensor. The
“model” we created included a lot of probabil-
ity detection work with triggers that if it de-
tected a significant target, it would go into a
target attack mode, or a field artillery spotting
mode is the better way to put it. It would then
begin to loiter and call in artillery fire. So we
had to bring in the accuracy of its target loca-
tion—target location errors, the accuracy of its
spotting, as well as the timing of its communi-
cations back to the ground station and how
much time it would take for artillery to react
and fire on those coordinates that it was calling
back. That was a piece.
We also recognized that we had to include
airborne survivability of the platform. We fun-
damentally used helicopter survivability algo-
rithms for that one. Then we needed to add
electronic warfare—the survivability of the
data link up and down. We used various
ARINC algorithms to model the data link and
its vulnerability. ARINC was an Air Force con-
tractor and we worked with Rome Labs up at
Rome Air Force Base to borrow them for our
use.
One of the studies that I did personally was
to analyze the survivability of the ground
equipment to artillery attack. We found that if
the enemy could directionally find the ground
station or the launch platform, et cetera, the
enemy had the ability to destroy that with en-
emy artillery. It was a neat little analysis. We
looked at it as you created a remote antenna
and moved it out X number of meters, what
was the affect on the probability of survival of
the ground station? That actually did change
the design of the unit to include a trailer that
had a remote antenna that could be erected,
and a generator to run it. So that affected the
structure of the unit.
Finally, as a TSM shop, we had to conduct
a cost analysis. That was another thing that I
got involved in. How much would one of these
things cost? Were there any cost efficiencies
that could be had? We also looked at training.
What was the best way to train crews for this
thing? We also provided the legal mix crew
with our algorithms for use in the legal mix
simulations because they wanted to model the
RPV as part of the future artillery.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have any field
experiments?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, we did. The
Army created an RPV platoon. Lockheed built
the Aquila RPVs; that little wooden propeller
right over there (on the wall in Vern’s office) is
from one of them. The launch platform was rail
mounted on a five-ton truck that launched it
out like a catapult from a carrier. We also cre-
ated a ground station with a data link. The most
troublesome piece was the recovery effort, be-
cause the RPVs didn’t have wheels and
couldn’t land on a runway.
BOB SHELDON: You had a big net?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Exactly. We had
a big net. The requirement was that they had to
operate from unimproved areas, in the forward
area. So when it started, the design was that it
took off with a catapult, so the engineers fig-
ured it ought to land like it was on a carrier,
too. So it would approach the landing area and
drop a tail hook and then fly over a net, which
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was horizontal and try and hook the tail hook,
and flop down in the net. We had several in-
stances of RPVs coming in too far above the net
or too far below the net, which was disastrous.
Or right into the side of the net trailer. We had
a lot of trouble with that. In the end they put
the net vertical, and then the RPV just flew into
the net. They took the tail hook off and just flew
it straight into the net, and the net worked
fairly well.
We had a lot of interesting times. We were
flying them at Fort Huachuca and one RPV lost
the lock on the data link and flew off into the
sunset into Mexico. (Laughing)
The reason it was at Fort Huachuca was the
airspace, but also the Army didn’t know ex-
actly, was this an intelligence asset or was it a
target acquisition asset? So what they did is
took a senior Intelligence Colonel—Sherwin
Arculis, or Arcy, from the MI school. They
moved him to Fort Sill and created the TSM.
The TSMs are somewhat equivalent to the pro-
gram managers on the material side. So you
had a combat developer which was a TSM, and
a material developer which was the program
manager (PM). They could ensure equality of
technology and engineering versus operational
requirements. Arcy was bemused, at best, with
what a COEA took, but he understood its im-
portance and was a very supportive boss for an
ORSA Captain.
They put the MI Colonel in charge of a
bunch of artillery people at Fort Sill, and then
assigned the whole office to the Combined
Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA)
at Fort Leavenworth. We were at Fort Sill. I was
attached to the office so I wore the Fort Sill
patch, but the rest of the office wore the Fort
Leavenworth CACDA patch, but were resi-
dents of Fort Sill, until they could decide.
It turns out now UAVs belong to the Avi-
ation Branch so neither the MI nor the artillery
ended up owning them. They belong to avia-
tion in the Army now.
BOB SHELDON: Was the stuff you
learned from that study relevant to your cur-
rent job as CIO?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I think some of
the data link work helped. Certainly was. The
use of a central ground station to control sev-
eral UAVs or RPVs at the time. I think that was
very relevant, also. And the value of intelli-
gence and intelligence information to the
ground operations. I think that also is probably
pretty pertinent to what I’m doing now. From
an ORSA perspective, I think it was a very good
experience in that everything was ground-
breaking. We weren’t replacing the tube on a
tank with a different caliber tank gun. This was
an entirely new capability. As I said before,
doctrine, TTP data, training, models. All of it
had to be built from the ground up. It was very
educational. The work we are doing now in
CIO/G6 with the satellite comms, Internet Pro-
tocol Joint Network Node down to battalion
level is equally revolutionary. LTG Boutelle, the
CIO/G6, was a PM and then PEO. So with my
TSM and TRADOC experience, I think we
make a good pair to help bring a totally new
system into the force.
BOB SHELDON: Any other projects you
worked on at Fort Sill during your ORSA tour.
VERN BETTENCOURT: No. This was
pretty time-consuming. I ought to point out a
couple of the illustrious people from Army OR
that I met as a result of this study. I was a mid
to senior level captain doing this work. The
head of—at the time it was TRASANA
(TRADOC Systems Analysis Agency) at White
Sands was Wilbur Payne. So I had a lot of
association with Wilbur and particularly his
people down there in doing this work. The
senior analyst that would come to our senior
advisory group meetings from the Pentagon,
from the office of the Deputy Under Secretary
for OR, was E. B. Vandiver, and there started a
long friendship. Whenever he would come to
Fort Sill for an RPV, study, I would be his escort
officer and have to meet him at the plane and
drive him around. He claims that the set of
orders appointing me his escort officer have
never been rescinded. As far as he’s concerned
(Laughing) I’m still duty-bound to perform that
function and do so on Civil War and fly fishing
trips regularly. The Chair of our Study Advi-
sory Group was Colonel Max Noah at
TRADOC, who later became a three-star gen-
eral and Comptroller of the Army.
BOB SHELDON: Do you have any Wilbur
stories?
VERN BETTENCOURT: The thing that
struck me was Wilbur never wore a tie, no
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matter where we were. He never wore a tie to a
meeting. He’d always wear his Mexican shirt.
Take his shoes off and put his feet up on the
desk. One of the things that, in retrospect,
strikes me about Wilbur is that with the expe-
rienced military or civilian analysts, he was
very demanding in the review of the studies
and in our COEA and SAG meetings. With a
new analyst, whether it be military or civilian,
which I was in this case—a new military ana-
lyst—he was very tutorial and attempted to
mentor them more than point out the errors of
their ways like he did the senior analysts. That
definitely sticks out in my mind with Wilbur.
Later, as an OR instructor at West Point, I had
Wilbur lecturing classes. He wore a tie!
BOB SHELDON: Do you recall any words
of advice that he gave you on your study?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Keep it simple
was clearly one thing. Because with the new
capability, what we were trying to portray was
pretty intricate. Also he talked about making
sure that we incorporated the effects of other
complimentary systems to make sure that we
were showing the true value, and not over-
stating the value of the new systems. He told us
to make sure our base case was robust, taking
into account other complimentary or related
capabilities that were out on the battlefield.
Finally, that we had to present results to the
general using terms that decision makers could
understand.
BOB SHELDON: Coming to the end of
your tour as an ORSA, you were looking for-
ward to getting back to artillery?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. Although as
I said earlier, I definitely think for a young
officer that a tour at your Branch school is a
good ORSA tour. However, I don’t think
there’s a lot of opportunity for that anymore.
The TRADOC school ORSA rosters have really
been cut back was we’ve downsized. Most of
the TRADOC ORSAs are now in TRADOC
Analysis Center (TRAC). So you really don’t
have that opportunity now, except for a few
people. I thought that was very valuable. I was
at the artillery school two years, then I was
curtailed to go to the Command and General
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.
A guy named Auggie Fucci—Major Fucci
at the time, took over the study and completed
it. Years later, Auggie, as a contractor, worked
for me here in the Pentagon. So that came full
circle.
I had a very enjoyable year at Fort Leaven-
worth. That was a great school. I enjoyed very
much doing the large operations plans and or-
ders, and I think my experience at Fort Sill and
Combat Development really helped me in that
area. The new strategy and tactics that they
were trying to teach up at Fort Leavenworth
was what we had been working with all along
in our studies. So that came easily to me, be-
cause I’d been dealing in it, in a future sense.
BOB SHELDON: What years were you at
Fort Leavenworth?
VERN BETTENCOURT: 1978 to 1979. A
couple of things stick out there. One, there were
electives again at Fort Leavenworth. But this
time if you had experience like I did, you were
allowed to teach the electives. I taught a com-
bat modeling elective, which was more a
combat war gaming elective. We had some of
the ORSAs in the sections act as assistant in-
structors and helped as our section mates do
the war gaming. We also taught a couple of the
periods on theory of war gaming, et cetera.
The other thing that sticks out in my mind
about Fort Leavenworth was the first day I
walked into the room and went to my table,
they were two-person tables—and there was a
guy sitting at my table that had a funny looking
uniform on. Turned out he was a Danish Infan-
try Major. Ulf Schieybu. I said to myself, “It’s
bad enough I’ve got to get through Leaven-
worth. Now I’ve got to carry an allied officer
through with me?” (Laughing)
It turns out Ulf spoke better English than I
did. Ulf knew a lot more about maneuver tac-
tics and doctrine and strategy than I did. We
had a grand old time. Provisions for an allied
table—a table that has an ally at it—were that
you could talk during your exams. And you got
50% more time for an exam, because obviously
the U.S. officer was explaining what the ques-
tions meant to the allied officer. Of course, in
our case, Ulf, who could read and speak and
write English better than I could, didn’t have
that problem. But we still followed the rules
that you could talk during your exams and
have extra time!
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Both of us ended up as Honor Graduates of
the course. I’m not saying there’s a correlation
there, but (Laughing) there might be.
Ulf later commanded an Infantry Division
in Denmark, and then his final tour, he com-
manded the Danish National Guard and retired
as a Major General.
Interestingly, after we finished Fort Leav-
enworth, he went to Monterey and took a quar-
ter of Operations Research courses.
BOB SHELDON: One quarter?
VERN BETTENCOURT: One quarter, and
then went back to Denmark. Another important
thing about having an allied officer at the table
was that you were invited to the allied parties
at Fort Leavenworth. At Fort Leavenworth the
goal was that your division would have a party
once a month. Your section would have a party
once a month. The allied core would have a
party once a month. And then the geographic
region of allies would have a party once a
month. So that averages out to four parties a
month. That was another very good thing
about having an allied tablemate. From Fort
Leavenworth I was sent to Korea.
BOB SHELDON: As an artillery officer?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Right.
BOB SHELDON: Where in Korea?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Uijongbu, which
is north of Seoul. North of the “No Smile” line,
we used to say. I was the Assistant S-3 of 2nd
Infantry Division Artillery.
BOB SHELDON: Were you a Major?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I was a brand
new Major. I got promoted to Major just before
I went to Fort Leavenworth and then went to
Korea. I was the Assistant S-3. The division
commander was a guy named ‘Barbed Wire’
Bob Kingston. He had two mottos of training.
Fit to Fight, and Train as you Fight. We did a lot
of training. That’s basically what we did. Ex-
cept for the fact that my family wasn’t there, it
was the best artillery professional tour that I
had.
BOB SHELDON: How far were you from
the DMZ?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Seoul is about 20
miles from the DMZ, so we were about 15
miles. We were north of Seoul. One of the
things that I really enjoyed there was General
Kingston demanded that every post have a de-
fense operations plan. We didn’t have one at
Camp Stanley, which was the Division Artillery
(DIVARTY) headquarters. So as the Assistant
S-3, I got to put together the operations order
for the defense of the camp. We had DIVARTY
headquarters. We had an artillery battalion. We
had an attack helicopter squadron and an ob-
servation helicopter company that belonged to
DIVARTY. We had a maintenance company,
and a couple other things. And then very near,
within about three kilometers of our compound
was an engineer company compound. As part
of their defensive plan, they fell into our com-
pound. So I had all these assets to play with.
About 10–15 kilometers away, but well within
our artillery range, was our general support 155
Battalion so we could plan mutually support-
ing fires for the two posts.
I read some Korean War history while I
was there and what amazed me reading about
the battles and then being there—particularly
during the winter, it was absolutely amazing to
me that Army soldiers could fight in that win-
ter. I have never been through a colder winter
than in Korea.
BOB SHELDON: Mud, too?
VERN BETTENCOURT: During the win-
ter there wasn’t mud. It was frozen. But during
the summer there was mud. I don’t know how
they fought during those winters. It’s just in-
credible to me that they could do that. The
sacrifices of the American soldier are beyond
words. Another thing that struck me. You men-
tioned the mud. In Korea, the terrain—it’s ei-
ther hills, muddy rice patties—which are in-
creasingly disappearing—or towns. There’s no
classic northern plain maneuver area in Korea.
So you can clearly see that, in large part, it’s an
infantry and aviation fight over there.
Another thing that was a precursor to this
assignment was that with those hills, the in-
credible difficulty of communicating over
there. I read in the Korean War books that, for
instance, the artillery forward observers
couldn’t communicate with their batteries to
call in fire, because their radios weren’t work-
ing. I said to myself, “Thank God we won’t
have that problem here.” Then you get out on
that terrain and guess what? You can’t commu-
nicate back because of the hills. It’s incredible.
We get around that now with satellite commu-
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nications. But this was in 1979–80. We didn’t
have a lot of satellite communications.
BOB SHELDON: Was Kim il-Sung, the el-
der—
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. Kim il-Sung
the elder was there. The year I was there, we
had a coup in South Korea and they deposed
the president and General Chun took over. I
was the DIVARTY Staff Duty Officer that night
and had to order DIVARTY to heightened
readiness. So that was an interesting year.
BOB SHELDON: A full one-year tour?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. From there I
came back to Fort Ord, California to the 7th
Infantry Division, and was again an Assistant
DIVARTY S-3. After a short time, I went down
to a composite battalion as the battalion opera-
tions officer. We had three batteries of 155
towed Howitzers, and one battery of eight inch
self-propelled Howitzers in that battalion.
BOB SHELDON: In the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the military services had logistics
problems with shortages of spare parts and
maintenance backlogs. Did you?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Oh, absolutely.
Particularly at Fort Ord. Back to some combat
development experience—when I got there, it
looked like the 7th Infantry Division was going
to be drawn down. So the question was, would
we go to three Cadre brigades where we had a
small Cadre in each brigade? Or would we
warehouse or mothball two brigades worth of
equipment and have one full-up brigade?
Those were the issues we were going through
for about the first half of the time that I was
there. Then the Army began to put more em-
phasis on light infantry divisions and the 7th
Infantry became one of those. Then the issue
was, how do we modernize into a light Infantry
Division? For instance, the unit that I was in,
the 6th Battalion, 80th Artillery, had the old
World War II M114 towed 155mm artillery. It
turned those over and it got the M198 modern
towed 155mm artillery. The eight inch battery
became a Multiple Rocket System Battery, an
MLRS Battery eventually. The division quickly
modernized. In the late 1980s it was one of the
divisions that ended up going to Panama for
the combat.
The artillery couldn’t fire at Fort Ord, so we
would go to Camp Roberts, down in central
California. As it turns out, Camp Roberts is
about 30 miles from my mother’s birthplace. It
is also home of an Army teleport site which is
pertinent to what I do now. Network Enterprise
Technology Command (NETCOM), that re-
ports to this office, mans that teleport site at
Camp Roberts. So I’ve gone to visit our units
there at Camp Roberts where I used to go fire.
We would fire there, or we would go to
Camp Irwin down in the desert if we wanted to
do a long road march. My experiences with
what is now Fort Irwin, the National Training
Center, was a sleepy little National Guard post,
down in the California desert where we could
take our guns and fire wherever we wanted to
fire. It’s certainly not that way anymore. We
used to road march the guns down there and
fire. That was another interesting two years.
I really have enjoyed all my Army assign-
ments. I can’t say I had a bad assignment. After
two years there, this organization called MORS
had a symposium at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS), as MORS does every few years. I
got a call from Colonel Al Grum (later retired as
a Brigadier General) who was the head of the
Engineering Department at West Point. He and
Lieutenant Colonel Dick Clarke, who was the
head of the Engineering Management part of
the Engineering Department at West Point, and
controlled the OR courses in the engineering
department. They wanted to meet with me at
the MORS symposium to discuss a teaching
assignment at West Point.
BOB SHELDON: Which year was this?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Had to be 1981. I
need to backtrack. When I was at Georgia Tech
in my degree program, Branch started to say,
“Where do you want to go?” I said, “I’m going
to go teach at West Point.” And Branch said,
“Okay.” So I started corresponding with the
Engineering and the Social Sciences Depart-
ment. The Social Sciences Department had a
course in econometrics. They were interested in
me teaching, and it was fine with Artillery
Branch. They didn’t mind.
Everything was moving along to where I
would go to West Point and teach after Georgia
Tech. And then some little old lady in tennis
shoes in the utilization branch of MILPERCEN
compared the slot at West Point—here comes
this ORSA business engineering thing back to
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haunt me—the slot at West Point in economet-
rics was an ORSA business slot. I was getting a
degree in ORSA engineering. And she said,
“You can’t go. That’s not a valid utilization.” So
Branch (Artillery) said, “Fine, if he can’t go
there, we can use him at Fort Sill.” Ironically it
turned out that at the end of my first year at
Fort Sill, when I got my first officer evaluation
report as an ORSA, there was somewhere on
there that indicated graduate-level utilization
tour or not. That block wasn’t checked and I
said, “Why isn’t this checked?” They said, “The
slot you’re in is not a graduate-level degree
required slot.” (Laughing)
So I’d been denied going to West Point to
teach, and they’d sent me there to a slot that
was equally inappropriate. Eventually they
changed the TDA (Table of Distribution and
Allowances) and got that slot straight.
After I graduated from Georgia Tech, I kept
corresponding periodically with both the Social
Sciences Department and the Engineering De-
partment. By the way, the guy trying to get me
to the Social Sciences Department was Major
Barry McCaffrey, who went on to some fame in
the Army. So Engineering had me on record.
Apparently what happened is they had an
ORSA instructor who broke his leg and then his
leg was set at West Point, and when they took
the cast off, it hadn’t healed so they sent him to
Walter Reed. It turned out that he had bone
cancer so he got medically retired. That left
them with an emergency vacancy on the staff.
Al Grum liked to have experienced ORSAs
on the staff. He didn’t like to have many young
ORSAs, because his philosophy was you ought
to be teaching the cadets from experience—not
from a textbook—which I agree with. So when
this vacancy came, they looked through their
files and said, “Who’s an experienced ORSA
that we could pull in here?” They called me,
and I called Branch and Branch said, “You’ve
been an Assistant DIVARTY S-3 twice. You’ve
been a battalion three. There’s not much more
you can do in the artillery branch as a major.”
So they asked and I came over to the MORS
symposium and interviewed for a position at
West Point in 1981. I was the first officer they’d
ever seen in BDUs, so that created some excite-
ment at MORS. We had just gone to those and
not many people had seen somebody in BDUs.
I interviewed there and they asked me if I
wanted to go to USMA and I said sure. So in the
summer of 1982 I left Fort Ord and went to
West Point to teach in the Engineering Depart-
ment.
BOB SHELDON: Other than interviewing
for a job, did you go to any working groups at
that MORS symposium?
VERN BETTENCOURT: No, I didn’t. I
came over from my battalion S-3 job, inter-
viewed, and went right back to my battalion S-3
job.
BOB SHELDON: What courses did you
teach initially?
VERN BETTENCOURT: When I got there,
OR really wasn’t a major, but they had a series
of OR courses. It was the two senior level OR
electives that were the capstone electives: Op-
erations Research 1 and Operations Research 2.
BOB SHELDON: Linear programming and
optimization?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. Probability
and statistics, linear programming, combat
modeling, how to do a study, dynamic pro-
gramming. We taught how to do COEAs, war
gaming. We used the McClintock theater model
that was the precursor to JSIMS and JWARS
and that series of models. The courses were
pretty robust. It was a compilation of the NPS
curriculum, and the reason was that Bob Dees
was there. Bobby ended up retiring as a Major
General from the Army. He had been to NPS
and he and Al Grum and Dick Clarke designed
these courses to be a mini-NPS curriculum.
When I finally received my orders to go to
West Point, I was able to leave the division
three months early and I went to Monterey to
audit OR classes at NPS. That is when I took the
combat modeling course from Jim Taylor,
search and detection theory with Washburn,
and a couple other courses. I went over and
audited a quarter en route to West Point. That
was a benefit of being stationed there at
Monterey because it didn’t cost West Point any-
thing.
BOB SHELDON: Just time off from your
job?
VERN BETTENCOURT:Actually, I signed
out of 7th Infantry Division. Signed into West
Point. But just stayed right there in quarters, for
that quarter. So that worked out great.
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I taught those two OR courses for the first
two years. The last year I was the department
research officer and taught an independent
study elective called ER 489. Cadets that had
taken the first course had an extra elective and
could do an independent study in Operations
Research. I had three of those and we worked
on the McClintock theater models. During the
first two summers, I worked at the Army War
College on verification and validation of simu-
lations. During the final summer, I ran the de-
partment New Instructor Training program.
BOB SHELDON: This would have been
1981 to ’84?
VERN BETTENCOURT: This was 1982 to
’85.
BOB SHELDON: Pete, when did you grad-
uate?
PETE DAVIDSON: 1981. I left a year ear-
lier. I didn’t like the OR course so I took civil
engineering.
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, the Depart-
ment of Engineering at the time had three ma-
jor curricula. It had weapons engineering, civil
engineering, and engineering management.
When they went to majors, you could major in
operations research or engineering manage-
ment, or a myriad of other things. But the ca-
dets have to take a sequence of two core engi-
neering courses. They can take engineering
management as a core engineering course. So
the interest in the engineering management
group of courses exploded. It ended up that
now there is a Department of Civil Engineering,
a Department of Mechanical Engineering,
which there always was, but the weapons sys-
tems folded into mechanical. And there’s a De-
partment of Systems Engineering which has the
ORSA courses now. I have the honor of serving
on the Board of Advisors to the Systems Engi-
neering Department.
I taught for two years at the senior level
and had several students who are still around.
One is Willy McFadden, who stands out and
has been President of MORS. Debbie Barts—
this was in ’82, the first female class graduated
in 1980, so females were still new there. Debbie
won the award as the best OR cadet that first
year I was there. And there’s several other stu-
dents that I still see around here. Richard Statts
who’s at MITRE was one of my students.
Each year I had somewhere between 30 and
40 students and it was neat because we spent
the whole year together. I taught both OR
courses. That was unusual for them to have one
professor for the whole year. Colonel Al
Grum’s philosophy was that the best possible
class would be for the instructor to walk in,
have a lesson planned, walk in and say, “Is
there anything on anybody’s mind?” And a
couple of cadets would raise their hands and
bring up an issue and it might be engineering,
or it might be ORSA, or it might be Army
football. Then you spent the entire hour talking
about what the cadets wanted to talk about.
That was his idea. Somehow you worked in
your learning points. What a great philosophy!
These were cadet students, but in less than nine
months they would be second lieutenants. They
need the practical wisdom.
Colonel Grum was very much into apply-
ing what you have learned as an ORSA out in
the Army, trying to draw for them how they
would be using the skills—not necessarily the
ORSA itself—but the skills of ORSA in their
work when they went out into the real Army.
Having seniors, they were interested in what’s
going to happen out in the real Army. So I
really enjoyed those three years.
BOB SHELDON: Did you get to MORS
while you were there?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, I did. My
first MORS Symposium (MORSS) was in 1983. I
got to MORSS twice while I was there.
BOB SHELDON: Present a paper?
VERN BETTENCOURT: No, I just went as
an attendee those years.
BOB SHELDON: Do you recall anything
from those MORSS?
VERN BETTENCOURT: My general im-
pression was that was really the first time that
I began to see OR from an Air Force and a Navy
perspective. I got a little Navy perspective out
at NPS, but not that much, not really seeing
studies per se. I saw search and detection the-
ory submarine detection problems and that
kind of thing. But I think the main thing that I
saw at MORSS was the other services’ use of
OR. That sticks in my mind.
And then the fact that MORS as a society
represented OR as a profession. I think those
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are the two things that stuck in my mind from
those early MORSS.
BOB SHELDON: Did you like teaching?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I liked being with
the cadets and working with them. So yes, from
that perspective I enjoyed the teaching part. I
certainly did not just get up there and lecture,
and start at one end of the board and go to the
other end of the board. I didn’t enjoy, nor did I
do that. Nor did Al Grum want us to do that. It
was a very participatory classroom and I did
enjoy that.
PETE DAVIDSON: As you’ve gotten cadet
interns here in the Pentagon, have you found
that they follow the same type of curriculum
and show up with the same skill set as when
they enter their senior year?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, they are. I
think they’ve got their math basics, and they’ve
got some of their OR basics, like what is a linear
program. They’re much more skilled in the use
of computers than the cadets were when I was
teaching. It is a little bit of a quandary in that
you’d like to get them here when they had
some of that senior capstone applied education
so that you could use them to really do some
studies. But they’re really not ready for that
when we get them here as interns. Usually we
get them between their junior and senior years,
so they haven’t had those capstone courses
when they come here.
There have been a couple of very sharp
ones. When I was working for Walt Hollis we
had a female—I can’t remember her name—but
she was extremely sharp. I had her do some
work on analyzing the accuracy and effective-
ness of precision munitions. What we try to do
is have them brief a senior individual when
they’re done with their two, or three, or four
weeks here. At that time we had an Under
Secretary of the Army, Mr. Ambrose. He was
very interested in Operations Research and I
was working for Walt Hollis at the time, who
worked for Ambrose. So we sent this cadet up
to brief Ambrose on her project, her analysis.
She briefed him, and he liked what she had
done. Two days later he was receiving a brief-
ing from one of the program managers. In fact,
I think it was in an ASARC, Army System
Acquisition Review Council. That’s chaired by
the Under Secretary and the Vice Chief of Staff.
They’re giving a briefing about the effective-
ness of these precision munitions, and Ambrose
goes, “Wait a minute. That’s not what I was
told the other day.” We get this phone call
down to the office. He had stopped the ASARC
and was calling for the cadet to come up and
brief what she had done. She briefed them, and
the PM said, “She’s right.” So that’s probably
the epitome of cadet project work here in the
Pentagon. That was back in the late 1980s.
BOB SHELDON: Getting ready to leave
West Point, did you want to go back into artil-
lery or stay an ORSA?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I wanted to go
back to artillery, but that didn’t work out, so I
went straight ORSA. In the capstone courses we
had a series of five lectures and they paired up
with what we were doing: COEAs, linear pro-
gramming, reliability analysis, cost analysis, or
whatever we were doing in the class. We’d get
some of the senior analysts in the Army to come
up and give a lecture to the cadets. The final
lecture was always Walt Hollis would lecture
about whatever he wanted to lecture about, on
Operations Research in the Army. So he came
up, and while he was there, he said, “What are
you doing when you finish here?” I said, “I
don’t know. I’ll probably go back to an ORSA
tour somewhere.” And he said, “How’d you
like to come work for me?” I said, “Yes, I’d
really be honored to come work for you.” So
from West Point I came down here to work for
Walt.
BOB SHELDON: Mr. Hollis had done his
background work on you?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I think that was
Al Grum and his affect. I think he had talked to
Walt, and Walt had an opening for one of his
military assistant slots.
BOB SHELDON: What projects did Walt
have you work on?
VERN BETTENCOURT: At the time Walt
had three or four Senior Executive Service and,
when I first got there, two military assistants.
One of the military assistants was the XO and
did a lot of admin stuff, but did a little bit of
Operations Research. The other military assis-
tant did fulltime Operations Research duty. The
thing that impressed me was that the military
assistants were not treated as assistants to the
SESs. Walt divided the Army pie up, and the
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. VERNON M. BETTENCOURT JR., FS
Page 14 Military Operations Research, V13 N3 2008
SESs took slices and the military assistants took
slices. So we worked directly for him. You can’t
really say the military assistants were co-equal
to the SESs, but for all intents and purposes,
you were co-equal to the SESs as far as what
you were doing and how you were represent-
ing Walt.
That has always stuck with me and im-
pressed me, because usually a military assistant
would be supporting an SES. I did field artil-
lery. I also did—by that time it was FA 49—the
ORSA professional development, and model-
ing and simulation (M&S) in general. And the
U.S.—Republic of Korea Analysis Symposium
that goes on every two years.
BOB SHELDON: Was the workload pretty
intense? With all those responsibilities.
VERN BETTENCOURT: It was intense. In
retrospect I thought it was intense, but having
been through the GWOT pace up here in the
Pentagon for the last three or four years, I
would say no. I would say nothing has been as
intense as the work is now.
The thing that I really enjoyed was that
once you started clicking with Walt, it could
take two or three or four months, or maybe you
never clicked with Walt. But once you did, you
had full rein. It was charge and report back
when necessary. I really enjoyed the latitude
and the authority that I was given as a lieuten-
ant colonel. You learned very quickly to play
the Hollis card. That hey, this isn’t me—this is
the Deputy Under Secretary that is doing this.
That was pretty heady stuff, but you had better
be operationally and technically correct.
Having had two other ORSA tours, one of
the tenants that I tried to stick with was to not
only present a problem to the analysts whose
work we were reviewing, but also try to sug-
gest ways that they could get around the prob-
lem that they had. I would do a lot of research
on how they get around this problem that
we’ve uncovered. It’s one thing to be a kibitzer
and say, “I don’t like the way you did that.” It’s
another thing to say, “I don’t like the way you
did that, and you ought to try this way.” Or not
just, “I don’t like the way you did that,” but,
“You have violated the assumptions of that
algorithm by the way you’re using it.” There
was a lot of that. I found that to be interesting
and challenging.
The other piece was that Walt found out
that—because I had just come from the acad-
emy and had refreshed myself by teaching this
stuff, and had the year as the research officer
for the department—that I could do what he
called his little back-of-the-envelope projects.
So a lot of times I’d found myself doing some
quick analysis to try and inform the office on
what should we be doing on this system, et
cetera.
One that comes to mind was the XM 80
protective mask that some testing had been
done on the masks in contaminate chambers,
on the mask’s sealing and protecting capacity.
The Army had determined that this one com-
pany would be eliminated from producing the
mask because their masks were failing these
tests. So they eliminated the company and then
there was a lawsuit. The company sued and
this went to court and the company hired a
statistician named Tukey.
BOB SHELDON: The famous statistician,
John Tukey?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. They hired
him to try and defend the fact that they should
not have been eliminated, and that the Army’s
testing was faulty. The issue was the size of the
sample. It was a small sample. So we went
through a lot of statistical theory, and found the
bootstrapping technique where you go and
sample several times from a small population.
We showed that at a statistically significant
level, their mask was failing the tests. This went
into court, and Tukey in court said, “The Army
statisticians are using the correct technique
here, and I can’t really refute what they’re say-
ing.” So that was interesting for a back-of-the-
envelope statistical analysis.
As a representative of Walt, I got to meet
the whole Army OR community and the Army
testing community. That was very interesting
and informative.
The Korean OR symposium—we had it
twice during the three years I was in his office.
That was a lot of work and entailed six trips to
Korea.
Another back-of-the-envelope analysis that
he had me do was a seventh trip to Korea to
look at the tunnel situation under the DMZ.
There had been two tunnels discovered. The
intelligence analysis said there had to be more
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tunnels, but we weren’t discovering them. So
he sent me over to take search and detection
theory, apply it to the tunnel problem, and see
if there was anything that could be done in the
way we were doing the search or the equip-
ment, et cetera. My conclusion was that we
really had to work on the sensors that we were
using. It was not a case of the number of sen-
sors or the search pattern. It was the physical
capability of the sensor that had to be im-
proved.
Ironically one of the Army labs sent a sci-
entist over to look at the same situation. Two
independent visits. And we both came to the
same conclusion. The PhD from the technical
perspective and me from the OR perspective,
that the weakest link in the search and detec-
tion problem was the capability of the sensor.
That was just another one of the back-of-the-
envelope kind of analysis that I did in that
office. Ironically (maybe not!) less than six
months after my visit they found a third tunnel!
BOB SHELDON: Did you see any transi-
tions in the 49 career field in the three years you
were there?
VERN BETTENCOURT: A couple of
things. One, there was a downturn in the num-
ber of people we were sending to graduate
school. That was pretty much an economic is-
sue. The other thing which we never solved at
the time, but at least began to make noise about
it, and begin to try and get a solution, was the
role of Operations Research officers in combat
units or operational units. We were trying to
get Operations Research officers and civilians
out with the units when they were operating.
BOB SHELDON: Did you see any payback
for that in Desert Storm?
VERN BETTENCOURT: In Desert Storm
we did get some officers over into the higher
headquarters, and we got analysts into the les-
sons learned field of Desert Storm. But they
weren’t embedded in the units. That’s been a
long, hard fight which we have now finally
reached a conclusion. We now have in the new
Army modular units, at division level we have
one or two ORSAs.
At the corps and above level, in what was
called the UEY, now it’s called Corps and
Armies, there are three ORSAs. We have them
on the unit TDAs, so they’re actually part of the
units now. That’s a major step forward for our
Army operations research.
The other thing that began to happen as
part of our initiative was that TRAC and CAA
began to associate with the field units and be-
gan to put teams out when these units went on
exercises, mainly corps and above. The ORSAs
would do some analysis in support of the units.
But the problem is, when you’re just doing that
during an exercise, unless you’re habitually as-
sociated, you don’t have a lot of credibility. I
mean, you’re always starting from square zero
if you’re just doing it during an exercise. Now
there are habitual associations with the Army
component commanders of a COCOM. Both
CAA and TRAC have that association, and now
we have the officers in the units. So there’s been
a lot of progress there.
BOB SHELDON: While you were in
DUSA(OR) did you work closely with many of
the Army analysis agencies like CAA or TRAC?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We worked with
all of them: AMSAA, TRAC, CAA, the Cost and
Economics Analysis Center. And, of course,
with Walt’s interest in tests and evaluation, at
the time it was called OTEA, the Operational
Test and Evaluation Agency. We worked with
them a lot. We worked with Air Force Studies
and Analysis, with Jim Bexfield and Clayton
Thomas. We also had associations with Rand
and some of the analytic contractors like Seth
Bonder. Most analysts don’t see that crowd, but
when you’re working in Walt’s office you do.
So that was also a tremendous learning experi-
ence.
BOB SHELDON: And you were associated
with MORS a little more then?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, I was. Walt
was the Army sponsor of MORS, so he had one
of his SESs as the sponsor’s rep. There were
times when that sponsor’s rep couldn’t go to
the sponsors meetings or the board meetings,
so I attended. The first MORS board meeting I
attended—it might have been an executive
council meeting—was at Wayne Hughes’ house
out in Monterey, California. That was in 1985.
I remember they voted on something and I
raised my hand and Wayne sternly said—
Wayne was the President of MORS at the
time—“Sponsor’s reps don’t vote.” (Laughing)
So I put my hand down pretty quickly. But I
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. VERNON M. BETTENCOURT JR., FS
Page 16 Military Operations Research, V13 N3 2008
was voting in favor of Wayne’s proposal. Then
in 1986 I got elected to the board.
BOB SHELDON: That was while you were
working for Walt?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. I worked for
Walt from 1985 to ’88. The first time.
BOB SHELDON: During your first tour
working for Walt, did he give you some per-
sonal mentoring?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. I think the
main thing—and in fact I was just using this
last week with some of the folks around here—
one of the main things that he got across to me
was that it’s important when you’re on a staff,
or when you’re anywhere else, that you put
yourself in your boss’s shoes. So that when you
bring an action to that boss, you have thought
from his or her viewpoint. And you bring an
action that is a complete action with recommen-
dations on what the office or the boss ought to
be doing at a particular meeting, or in review-
ing a particular document, et cetera. That you
not just pose issues, but you bring solutions.
Also that you bring all of the relevant informa-
tion that the boss will need when they go to a
meeting. As a younger analyst, one might say,
“The boss ought to be able to figure that out.”
As you go along and get a little more senior and
experienced, you realize—particularly here,
they’re bouncing from meeting to meeting.
And they don’t have time to figure that out.
That’s the job of the action officer. Putting your-
self in your boss’s shoes and taking all of the
requisite initiative that is required to work a
complete action from that perspective, I think is
one of the big things that I learned. And like I
say, I’m applying that to our action officers here
in the CIO almost on a daily basis.
The other thing that I learned was that
there is a basis of knowledge. There is an algo-
rithm. There is a methodology. If nothing else,
there’s the OR process which I taught up at the
Academy. And that needs to be applied. If you
do that, things that other people will have for-
gotten or not thought about will come to the
floor. That’s another thing that I clearly learned
in that office, particularly in doing some of the
back-of-the-envelope analysis, but also in re-
viewing some of the larger analysis that the
Army analytic agencies, or some of the other
service analytic agencies that we would get to
review.
A couple of times Army agencies brought
up analyses where they had violated the as-
sumptions of the algorithm. If you don’t take
the time to look at the algorithm, you’re not
going to know that. A thoroughness in prepa-
ration and an expansive enough viewpoint,
even as an action officer at the SES level, these
are the things that need to be solved. And then
how would you recommend that they be
solved and why.
That was elite stuff for a lieutenant colonel.
But once I got that down, or realized that’s
what he was asking me to do, I think we began
to click pretty well.
BOB SHELDON: Is Walt the exception in
the Army community for utilizing back-of-the-
envelope calculations to base decisions? Or
have you been able to use that elsewhere in the
community?
VERN BETTENCOURT: There are others
in the community. I know some like that in the
test and evaluation community, given the time
they have available from the time that the test
results are in until they have to be briefing a
senior review group or a acquisition review
group, they do a lot of set piece statistical anal-
ysis. But they also do some very good back-of-
the-envelope analysis. I see it there.
Our officers that are out with the units are
certainly doing that, to good effect. Gene Wool-
sey at the Colorado School of Mines is famous
for teaching those techniques. We send some
officers there, in large part, for that reason. So
that the Army has some people that are skilled
in back-of-the-envelope quick reaction analysis
techniques.
BOB SHELDON: Were you setting your-
self up for a follow-on assignment, or did Walt
have an assignment in mind for you?
VERN BETTENCOURT: When I ap-
proached the end of three years, in that tour, I
began to look around for where would I go
from here, knowing that—this was 1988—in ’89
I was eligible to retire. Walt and General Dave
Robinson, who was the head of TRAC at the
time, approached me with a proposition re-
garding TRAC Monterey, out at NPS. The issue
at the time was that the Army leadership, and
in particular the Army analytic leadership, felt
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that TRAC Monterey was not producing things
of value. I grew up in California, and the
thought was I probably wanted to retire out
there. So the proposition was, “If you’re going
to California anyway, how about if you take
over TRAC Monterey and see if you can rein-
vigorate it? If you can, great. If you can’t, we’re
going to shut it down.”
That was a no-lose proposition, and it got
me back to California, got me back to
Monterey. So from Walt’s office, I went to
TRAC Monterey.
BOB SHELDON: TRAC Monterey is still
alive today so you must have done the right
thing.
VERN BETTENCOURT: We did a lot of
work with the NPS faculty to make sure that
TRAC Monterey was not just a tenant. That it
was well integrated with the faculty research
program and with the student research pro-
gram at NPS. With the knowledge that I had of
the Army ORSA community at large from be-
ing in Walt’s shop for three years, we were able
to get research projects that were relevant to
what the Army was working on at the time and
also to string together research projects. One of
the main things we tried to do is to create a field
of research and the preeminent one out there
was in model and simulation—combat model-
ing. The JANUS model. To string together some
consecutive student research projects that
would advance issues that the Army wanted.
The other thing that we had there was
TRAC Livermore. There were two TRAC offic-
ers at Livermore National Labs that were work-
ing on combat modeling. General Robinson, by
that time it may have been General Bob
Howard, and Mike Bauman, who was the dep-
uty of TRAC at the time, attached those two
officers to me. So I had TRAC Monterey and
TRAC Livermore. So I usually spent the equiv-
alent of one week a month up at Livermore
working with those two officers.
They were out on the end of a long tether,
so it was a lot of work to get them working on
combat modeling issues that were of interest to
the Army. They were working on, a model
called CONMOD (Conflict Model), and the
Army had put several million dollars into
CONMOD.
Walt called one morning and said, “I want
you to evaluate CONMOD, and I want you to
tell me if the Army ought to keep it or not. And
if we ought to just terminate that project or
not.” It was becoming controversial with the
amount of money that was being spent. And
where was the return for that money? So one of
the major things we did was set up an evalua-
tion of CONMOD and conduct it. We had 30
people that we brought in to wring out the
model. We looked at the requirements docu-
ment for the model and what Livermore said
they were going to deliver. Then we wrung it
through a user feasibility test on was it deliv-
ering this or not? The result was we terminated
the model.
BOB SHELDON: Was there any salvage
value from CONMOD?
VERN BETTENCOURT: There were a
couple. It was one of the first object-oriented
models, so there were a lot of lessons learned
on the object-oriented aspect. There was some
detection. There was some modeling of sensors
that was helpful, and we salvaged that. But the
major issue was that they were looking for light
under the lamppost. We had told them that the
issue the Army needed most was, “How do I
model command and control?” That’s what we
wanted them to work on. What they did was
work on everything else: mobility, attrition, tar-
get detection; not command and control. So
after three years and at least $10 million of
effort, when we evaluated the model, it was all
red in command and control. There was noth-
ing there so we terminated the project.
BOB SHELDON: Any other success sto-
ries?
VERN BETTENCOURT: There was a lot of
work on JANUS by the students. A Navy stu-
dent used it to analyze the effectiveness of the
Theater Land Attack Missile (TLAM), and the
Navy used that analysis in some of their acqui-
sition decisions on TLAM. That was neat, that
you had a Navy student coming over to an
Army agency and using an Army model. But
what he was doing was modeling the affects on
ground forces of TLAMs, and JANUS could do
that.
Another big effort that we had was the
National Training Center, and the tapes—the
data—from the training events that were com-
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ing off of the instrumentation down at Fort
Irwin. They went to an Army Research Institute
(ARI) office at Presidio Monterey, which was
just down the street from NPS. So we set up a
partnership between Rand, Santa Monica,
TRAC Monterey, and ARI Monterey to do
some analysis of the data that was coming out
of Fort Irwin. Rand has since put out several
studies which were pretty important on the
effects of things like intelligence and scouting
in the battle. He who has the best scouting and
fights for information will usually win the bat-
tle. They were drawing some of these conclu-
sions from those databases that were there at
Monterey. What we were doing at TRAC
Monterey with the help of student research and
some of our staff research was to work a way to
bring the data from those data tapes into the
JANUS model. So that the students could then
fight alternatives of battles, altering various at-
tributes. Rand also had JANUS and, in our
partnership, they began to use it for the same
purpose.
BOB SHELDON: Which professors did
you work with on the NPS faculty?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Wayne Hughes,
Jim Taylor, Al Washburn, Peter Purdue. And
another professor in the field of simulated an-
nealing who was also working on complexity
theory. So we had some students working with
him on taking JANUS results and trying to use
simulated annealing, and some of his efforts
turned out pretty well.
The command-and-control professor was
Mike Sovereign. We were working with Mike,
particularly on the CONMOD evaluation at
Livermore. If it could do command and control,
what would that be? The theory of command
and control.
BOB SHELDON: Had you already made
your decision to retire from the Army at
Monterey?
VERN BETTENCOURT: About halfway
through the tour out there at TRAC Monterey,
we made the decision to retire, and it was a
family decision. Part of the issue was that al-
though I was very happy in Monterey, my fam-
ily was not happy in Monterey. So it was a
one-sided family decision. Our oldest daughter
was a senior in high school when we took her
out there. She’s very socially adaptive and ac-
tually it was a great year for her. She still has
friends there. She went on from Monterey High
School to Cal Poly and started her college ca-
reer there.
The reason it was a good year for her is
when you go from Fairfax County high schools
to Monterey public schools as a senior, she
spent all but one course over at Monterey Pen-
insula College. Because there was nothing at
the high school that she needed to take after
having her first three years of high school here
in Fairfax County. For the younger two, who
were in middle school, it was effectively the
same thing. They just were not challenged nor
were they happy academically. As a father who
has spent his later years in an academic disci-
pline like OR, that was not a good thing to hear
from your kids. We were investigating private
schools in the Monterey area, but they were
prohibitively expensive.
Then there was my wife. Her education
was as an elementary school teacher. But what
was happening was every time I would move,
she’d go to the bottom of the priority list and
have to work her way up from substitute
teacher to teacher. So when we got out to
Monterey the first time, she said, “This just is
not enjoyable, always going to the bottom of
the stack again.” I suggested, “You ought to
think about the civil service. It’s everywhere I
go.” So she got on as a temporary card punch
operator in the purchasing department of Fort
Ord as a GS3. Then she began to work herself
up, and when I was in Walt’s office here in
Washington, at the end of that tour, she was a
GS12 at the Navy yard working for the Military
Sealift Command as a contracting officer.
When we went to Monterey, she had to
take a three-grade downgrade to a GS9 pur-
chasing agent again over at NPS. So she was
not exactly a happy camper either. The good
part was she was, among other things, the pur-
chasing agent for TRAC Monterey. So (Laugh-
ing) although there were some squabbles about,
“Are you authorized this or not?” We had a
family thing going. The other good thing about
TRAC Monterey in the purchasing area was
that our money came from TRAC, went to Fort
Ord to the Army Finance Office, and then was
transferred to NPS to the Navy finance office
where it became two to three-year money.
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When it was Army money it was one-year
money, and you’d better damned well spend it
during that year. But over in the Navy, it be-
came research money. It became two to three
years. Number one. Number two, if the Army
wouldn’t allow us to do something, we would
claim, “Our money is with the Navy so we’re
going to purchase this with the Navy.” If the
Navy wouldn’t let us do it, we’d revert back to
the Army and say, “We know our money
comes from the Army so we really ought to
follow the Army.” (Laughing) You could play
the two ends against the middle. So that was all
good financially and administratively.
But anyway, we made a family decision to
retire. As I looked around, the opportunities for
a military ORSA person in California were not
that great. You could go down into the LA area
with Rand, or you could go with Livermore. Or
you could go into the San Jose area with one of
the metal benders like FMC. But we decided it’s
probably best for the kids to come back to
northern Virginia where they could get back
into the Fairfax County school system. So we
retired and moved back here.
BOB SHELDON: 22 November, 2005.
We’re in Vern Bettencourt’s office to continue
our interview. I want to backtrack to discuss
your professional engineering license. What’s
the story behind that?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Actually it is an
OR-related issue. I was on the faculty at the
engineering department at West Point. West
Point was the first engineering school in the
nation. But in the 1983–84 timeframe, it was not
an accredited engineering school. Air Force and
Navy were accredited with the Accrediting
Board of Engineering Technologies, ABET. So
in the recruiting for the academies, this was
being used against West Point. If a candidate
were asked, “Why are you interested in going
to a military academy?” and they’d answer, “I
want to get an engineering education.” then the
Air Force and Navy recruiters would immedi-
ately say, “Why would you ever want to go to
West Point? It’s not an accredited engineering
school.”
Also for our graduates, we had gotten
down to two states—Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia, who would administer the engineering
exam to West Point graduates, because they
had not gone to an accredited school. So that
was creating a problem for particularly the civil
engineer officers. And Pennsylvania had an-
nounced that it wasn’t going to test West Point-
ers anymore, so we were down to one state that
would test. For those reasons as well as the
quality of the education, the Dean and the
Board of Visitors at the Academy decided that
they wanted to become an accredited engineer-
ing school. So all the people on the engineering
faculty and disciplines were told, “If at all pos-
sible, you need to get your professional engi-
neering license.” The OR branch of the engi-
neering department looked around and
discovered that one of the licenses was a pro-
fessional engineer of industrial engineering,
and that’s where OR came in under this pro-
cess.
There were several of us who had to get our
EIT, Engineering in Training exam. We had to
pass that before we were eligible to take the
professional engineering exam. The EIT exam
goes across all the disciplines of engineering:
math, chemistry, physics, Fluid dynamics, and
all of this good stuff. So we had to go back and
study in all of these basic undergraduate disci-
plines, if we hadn’t already taken the EIT exam.
Several of us hadn’t because we weren’t becom-
ing engineering officers.
We were taking brush-up courses with ca-
dets and reading all of these old or these very
new disciplines for us—a lot of us swore that
there was a whole new row on the chemical
table of elements from when we saw it as ca-
dets. But we had to go through that. That was
an all-day exam. We took that exam, and then
got our grades back. Then we had to go take the
professional engineering exam, which actually
compared to the EIT, was a cake walk, because
it was focused on, in our case, industrial engi-
neering.
There were six questions that you had to
answer out of ten, three in the morning and
three in the afternoon, and you could choose.
Of the six, four of them were right out of our
courses that we were teaching in Operations
Research. One that I chose was related to
courses I’d taken at Georgia Tech, because I
was in the Industrial and Systems Engineering
Department at Georgia Tech. So industrial en-
gineering was somewhat familiar to me. And
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one was just kind of a guess question that I
tried to work through.
Another anecdote was that Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute was where the exams
were to be given. But because we were from
West Point, and New York wouldn’t test us, we
had to coordinate with Virginia to have exams
sent to New York to administer to us. So they
were passing out the exams and they passed
out civil engineering, mechanical engineering,
structural engineering. They went through all
of it, and then they said, “Does anybody not
have an exam?” Two of us raised our hands.
We were the two OR, and they said, “What are
you?” And we said, “Industrial engineering.”
They didn’t have the packets. Virginia had not
sent them. So they called Virginia and it ended
up that we went back to West Point. Virginia
hired one of the other instructors in the Engi-
neering Department. They paid him $50 to
proctor the exam to us the next day, and we sat
in our offices at West Point and took the exam.
BOB SHELDON: And passed?
VERN BETTENCOURT: And passed.
Right.
BOB SHELDON: So you’re a licensed en-
gineer in the state of Virginia?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. Industrial
Engineering. The Academy did get accredited.
The maximum period was six years that you’d
be accredited for, and it did. It was a significant
event for the Academy, and they had to add the
ABET courses as they were called. ABET cadets
had to take one or two additional courses to get
enough hours of engineering, and practical en-
gineering to qualify for ABET accreditation. We
had to reclassify one of the classes in military
topology and change it to land sciences or
something like that. We needed one or two
more credits of applied engineering and we
were able to get it that way. But it did help the
academy, and it helped the curriculum and the
OR cadets, as well as the other accredited dis-
ciplines. Folks there are continuing to take the
engineering exam.
BOB SHELDON: Did you ever use that
license for anything after the fact?
VERN BETTENCOURT: No. (Laughing)
BILL DUNN: You are a former 49. Where
do you think the Army’s 49 Program is going?
VERN BETTENCOURT: The 49 career
field has always been an extremely healthy ca-
reer field for the Army. If you look right now at
the three and four-stars we have around the
world, several of them are 49 officers. A couple
of the four-stars are 49s. Three or four of the
three-stars are 49s. So it’s been a very healthy
career field.
There’s some issues with the single-track
philosophy that we’ve gone to now. Some peo-
ple are beginning to say that we need to re-look
at the decision that an officer can only be a war
fighter or an analyst. That you can’t be both. I
was here when you could be both, and we
would alternate. If you look at the name of the
discipline—Operations Research—it’s very im-
portant that the military officers maintain their
military currency.
It’s also important that we pair them with
civilian and contractor expertise to get the anal-
ysis done. But to have all ORSAs being strictly
ORSA is an issue. There’s nothing wrong with
a few single track officers who get PhDs, and
specialize in ORSA if they want to. But I think
there is some risk if we don’t allow officers to
alternate.
Conversely, one of the real successes of
Army ORSA recently has been that we’ve been
able to place officers out in operational units. In
Desert Storm, in the initial parts of the initial
phases of Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Free-
dom, there was some difficulty in getting the
ORSAs into theater. But now they’re in theater
and integrated in at the division and corps
level, and they’re performing great work out
there. That’s been a real success.
In the meantime, in the new modular Army
units at division and corps and theater, there
are now 49s on the TO&Es (Table of Organiza-
tion and Equipment) of the units. So there will
no longer be a question of should the ORSA
deploy into the initial combat. They will go as
part of the units that they’re on the TO&E for.
That’s been some real healthy development in
Army OR. It’s more like a return to our roots,
because that’s where we grew up in the appli-
cation of the scientific method to military oper-
ations. So that’s been a real advancement for
Army OR.
At the same time, we need to re-look at the
personnel management issues. With the current
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OPTEMPO for our officers (GWOT rotations,
for example), it is very difficult to send an
officer to school for two years. Army leadership
is wrestling with this issue.
BILL DUNN: There’s been talk about
whether the 49 program was declining or going
to go off the map. And in the Army—and other
services, too, but I’m more familiar with the
Army—those retired ORs have been rich re-
cruiting sources for analysts in industry. So
without them, that’s going to leave a serious
dent in the kind of people that contractors are
able to hire.
VERN BETTENCOURT: I agree with you.
And in fact, I’ve made that point in discussions.
People talk about we’ll just cut military—mil to
civ, and we’ll get our ORSAs that way. My
question when I hear that has been, “And
where will those ORSAs come from?” Because
as you say, right now they’re coming from 49s
that are retiring. If you don’t have that pool,
where are you going to get military experience
and knowledge of ORSAs? I think it will be a
real dilemma.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s go back to Monterey
and pick up where you were retiring from the
Army. Tell us why you came back to Virginia.
VERN BETTENCOURT: I really enjoyed
doing military OR. And as I looked around
California, and where would I do military OR
in California, it pretty much boiled down to the
San Jose arena or the Los Angeles arena. Either
one of those had issues of the cost of living, the
traffic, which sounds ironic since my decision
was to come back to northern Virginia. But both
of those seemed to be fairly prohibitive. The
quality of life, the cost of living, et cetera. And
also the redundancy of job opportunities. In
other words, my perception was that there
were only a few military ORSA job opportuni-
ties at each location in California, whereas back
here in the D.C. area, there were multiple job
opportunities. So I made the decision then to
come back here. My job search focused on a
couple of for-profit companies and a couple of
the FFRDCs. In all cases, the networking nec-
essary to do that had been facilitated through
MORS. My choices came down to going with
an FFRDC or going with a for-profit firm. I
chose to go with the small 8A for-profit firm, in
large part because I felt that the FFRDC option
would always be there. This 8A option proba-
bly wouldn’t be, and so I chose to go with a
smaller system engineering firm.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of work were
you doing?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I was basically
doing analysis, and M&S. I came in and imme-
diately was put in business development in
those areas for the small firm. We were able to
get a couple of fairly lucrative contracts and did
support for the Army and also for what is now
J8 on the Joint Staff.
BOB SHELDON: What major projects did
you take on?
VERN BETTENCOURT: In J8, a lot of the
effort was in the running and modification of
TACWAR. We had people down there working
that and doing analysis. For the Army, one of
our big contracts was for TRAC Leavenworth
in beginning to help contract out some of their
analytic capability. In other words, as they had
funds, but not people to do analysis, it was to
create a team of analysts out there with tools
and direct requisite experience and capability
to do the type of analysis that TRAC Leaven-
worth does at the upper tactical and opera-
tional levels of land combat.
BOB SHELDON: How long did you stay
there?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I stayed there a
little less than 16 months, and then made the
decision that I really wanted to be closer to the
action of the government. So I transferred to
MITRE Corporation, over in McLean.
BOB SHELDON: What part of MITRE?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I started out as an
Army advisor to one of the technical divisions.
Then MITRE started to form technology cen-
ters, and one of them that they formed was the
M&S technology center. These were depart-
ment level organizations at MITRE. So when
that was formed, I became the assistant depart-
ment head of the M&S technology center. As
we went through the work, it became obvious
that really that center was functioning in two
areas.
One was the true technology of M&S with
an emphasis on C3I, which is what MITRE
does. Another pocket of work was developing
the applications of the M&S, to do analysis in
C3I issues. We saw that we were getting more
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and more of that applications type of work at
MITRE. We saw that not just in our depart-
ment, but elsewhere in that division of MITRE,
supporting not just the Army, but supporting
also the Navy and OSD. The Air Force has its
own separate part of MITRE up in Massachu-
setts. But supporting the Joint Staff, OSD, the
Navy and Army in other departments, they
were beginning to do analysis of C3I issues
using M&S.
The division had three technology centers:
modeling and simulation, networking, and ar-
tificial intelligence. After about a year in the
technology center, our Technical Division Di-
rector, Andrea Weiss, went up to MITRE man-
agement and was allowed to form what we
called the Synthetic Environment Applications
Department (SEAD).
So the three technology centers kept the
pure technology project work. And any kind of
applied analysis came in to the SEAD, and I
became the department head of that. Effectively
we ran most of the work for the division, and
then we would matrix out to these centers, and
also out to the other departments in MITRE that
had C3I subject matter expertise.
BOB SHELDON: Were you building new
models or improving legacy models?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We were doing
both. Most of the research was in the new mod-
els. Of course, we matrix’d back to the M&S
technology center. A lot of what we were doing
was focused on modeling of command and
control. And also how do you reflect in combat
modeling outcomes the influence of command
and control systems and intel systems.
BILL DUNN: As I recall, when you were
with MITRE, you were spending quite a bit of
time out at Fort Leavenworth.
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. We had
projects with TRAC Leavenworth and also with
the National Simulation Center on incorpora-
tion of command and control into the Army
combat models that they had at the time. We
were doing some research on bringing artificial
intelligence into automated command and con-
trol modeling. Not modeling of automated
command and control, but automated com-
mand and control modeling. We did a lot of
work in those areas.
BOB SHELDON: You were in a MORS
leadership position at that time?
VERN BETTENCOURT: By the time I got
to MITRE, I was Past President.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s backtrack then and
cover more of your MORS history.
VERN BETTENCOURT: While I was still
in Walt Hollis’ office as his military assistant, I
attended a couple of the Board meetings as the
acting sponsor’s rep. And then I think in large
part because of the paucity of uniformed mili-
tary on the MORS Board, I was elected to the
Board of Directors in 1986 and served on the
Board for twelve years after that. After I was
elected in 1986, I chaired several committees at
MORS mostly on the administration manage-
ment side of the house. I chaired the audit and
membership committees in 1987 and chaired
the management committees in 1988. I also
chaired one of the C4ISR workshops. In 1992 I
chaired the C3I Measures of Effectiveness
workshop that took place at Fort Leavenworth.
BOB SHELDON: Were you at MITRE at
the time?
VERN BETTENCOURT: In 1992 I was at
MITRE. I began my MORS presidency at the
systems engineering firm, but shortly after-
wards transferred to MITRE and finished out
my MORS presidency at MITRE.
BOB SHELDON: What other roles did you
play on the MORS Board?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I started with the
Board of Directors position, and continued up
through the admin and management track. Sec-
retary Treasurer in 1989, Vice President of Ad-
ministration in 1990, and then President in
1991. I was also the advisor to the M&S advi-
sory group, and also the working group advi-
sor for the symposium.
BOB SHELDON: What were the issues
that you tackled when you were VP and Pres-
ident?
VERN BETTENCOURT: One the issues
that I’m most proud of is as the Membership
Committee Chairman. That was when we be-
gan to define the classes of membership. When
I became the Membership Committee Chair-
man, there was no membership other than the
Board of Directors. So in that year, we tackled
the issue of what should be the classes of mem-
bership and recognition that we have for the
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MORS members. What should be the voting
routine and all of this. Part of the issue was
people who we now call members, were begin-
ning to feel a little bit disenfranchised. They
were beginning to ask questions about, who are
the members of MORS? At that time it was the
Board of Directors—period.
The other issue was that since the Board of
Directors was fundamentally the only avenue
for involvement in the administration and run-
ning of the society, that we were getting a lot of
retreads on the Board. And one of the issues
was, how do we allow for this knowledge and
experience to exist, but yet turn over the Board
and get more involvement on the Board and
younger membership on the Board? That’s
where the idea, the genesis of creating the Fel-
lows originated. So we looked at the member-
ship as those who had attended meetings, and
then the Board was the elected Board, and then
Fellows as our senior advisory members if you
will.
We brought that to the Board through com-
mittee, and were able to get it adopted while I
was the Vice President of Administration.
BOB SHELDON: You chose that an indi-
vidual’s membership would be current three
years after attending a MORS meeting? How
did you arrive at three years?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We looked at
what was the repetition of folks. We looked at
particularly the mailings of PHALANX and
Dick Wiles gave us some statistics on how
many people were receiving it from attending a
meeting. There was a knee in the curve at three
years. After three years, people would either
come back to a meeting, or else they would just
drop out of it. So we chose three years.
Also, if you look at the rotation of the meet-
ings, about every four years they revisited geo-
graphic sectors, like D.C. or California or New
York. They go in about a four-year cycle. So if
you were good for three years from the time of
the meeting, by the time it got back you had
renewed your membership.
BOB SHELDON: How was your relation-
ship with the MORS sponsors?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I think we had a
very good relationship. One of the issues was
the special meetings. When I began as Presi-
dent, I was not exactly happy with the number
in the queue. We were just beginning to realize
how important the special meetings were as far
as the ability to rapidly respond to the Spon-
sors. The ability to focus on a topic and provide
responses to the Sponsors on a topic of their
interest was crucial. We also were discovering
that this was a great generator of membership
from communities of people that didn’t go to
the annual symposium, and they were also a
source of funding for the Society.
One of the issues that I thought important
was the number of proposed special meetings
was too small, so we worked hard to generate a
queue of topics that carried over through the
years. In doing so, we worked hard to be re-
sponsive to the Sponsors.
Another thing was that, taking the presi-
dency in 1991, Desert Storm and Desert Shield
were just taking place so we put emphasis on a
rapid turnaround special meeting on OR in that
conflict.
Back to the early 1990s, late 1980s, the Ber-
lin Wall came down and there was talk of
drawing down the military. We were, in fact,
headed that way. From a strategic perspective
of MORS, there was concern about what was
the effect on the Society. Would the member-
ship and the revenue of MORS drop off?
So we began to do a lot of planning on what
would it take to maintain MORS as a viable
society if the military budget declined. We then
began to look at other key structures for the
symposia: the potential of additional appropri-
ate sponsors, and different concepts for special
meetings. Luckily the budget and the member-
ship did not drop.
As an organization of volunteers, with a
Board which only meets twice a year, I think
strategic planning is very important. You need
to have a clear plan from the beginning so the
Board and members can work their pieces in
the interim. The Executive Council spent our
time immediately after elections coming up
with a strategic plan for the year to include the
Symposium and special meetings. Chris Fossett
had been doing some similar work at GAO and
was a tremendous help. As was Lannie Elder-
kin from the legal perspective, and of course
the MORS administrative staff. Part of our
planning was to review the fundamental pur-
poses of MORS. One of the things that gener-
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ated was the MORS professional journal, and
during the year I was President, we got that.
E. B. Vandiver implemented it the next year as
President.
BOB SHELDON: For the record, you came
up with the name MCAP (MORS Coveted
Acrylic Paperweight).
VERN BETTENCOURT: That term was
first used at the symposium in Monterey.
David Chu was our keynoter. At the time I
think he was the Senior VP at Rand and he
agreed to come speak to us. I had the new
acrylic paperweight as the gift. I gave it to him
and I told him, “You should be honored to be
the first recipient of the MORS coveted acrylic
paperweight award.”
BOB SHELDON: Was that brand new at
the time?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. I’m fairly
certain that David was the first one to receive it.
And the name MCAP stuck.
BOB SHELDON: Going back to the special
meetings . . .
VERN BETTENCOURT: It was in line
with our strategic plan of trying to cut expenses
so that we could maintain the Society if our
revenues dropped off.
BOB SHELDON: Two perennial topics for
MORS special meetings are VV&A and M&S.
Since both of those are in your arena, how do
you feel about MORS success in holding those?
VERN BETTENCOURT: In some of the
tough issues, you might not have total suc-
cesses, but I think in the overall science of M&S,
I think MORS has played a critical role. If you
go back to the DMSO policies the definitions
are very familiar. The VV&A: Verification, Val-
idation, and Accreditation. Those terms that
provide a structure of looking at M&S came out
of a series of MORS workshops that Jim Sikora
and Marion Williams conducted. And that has
stuck; that’s still there today. On how we eval-
uate models and simulation for acceptability
for use in training and analysis.
In the C4I area we held a couple work-
shops. The one that I held, and one that pre-
ceded it, that looked at the use of M&S as a C4I
tool. The definition of metrics and MOEs that a
lot of people still use began in those workshops.
How can I measure command and control
in models and simulation? General Dutch
Shoffner gave the keynote address at the work-
shop that I chaired, and his topic was command
and control. He talked about the differences
between ‘command’ and ‘control.’ One being
an art; the other being a science. The services
asked for the transcript of that speech, because
it was really one of the first recorded discus-
sions of what’s the difference between ‘com-
mand’ and ‘control,’ and what does that mean
for analysis of M&S.
I can’t vouch for the other services, but I
know that in the Army you still see that dis-
tinction today in definitions. Because it’s the art
of command, battle command, and the science
of control. So I think MORS has definitely
played a role. One of the things that the work-
shop allows you to do is to focus on a topic and
to try and provide the sponsors something of
value coming out of the workshops.
Unfortunately, I don’t think MORS has yet
broken the code of where a Working Group in
the symposium can continue a thought process
and produce something of value, other than of
course, the joint collaboration that’s extremely
important. The peer review and collaboration
of individual papers within a Working Group
are very important. But what these special
meetings allow you to do is to focus on a topic.
Begin with an agenda that you want to accom-
plish and then accomplish it. Even if it takes
one, two, or three workshops to do it.
BOB SHELDON: How many years did
you spend at MITRE?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I spent five years
at MITRE, and I was a department head for
about two years. That division reorganized and
I became the Army program manager for that
division. I was the program manager for all
the Army work that the division was doing. I
did that for about six months. And then I
became the associate Army program director
for MITRE. There was an individual who, for
all of MITRE, oversaw MITRE Army pro-
grams, and I became his assistant at that point
about three to six months. Then I was hired as
a senior executive in the Army down at
TRADOC, and it was a major decision to
leave MITRE.
BOB SHELDON: Did some friend of yours
actively recruit you, or did you find out about
the job opening?
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VERN BETTENCOURT: Through the MORS
network, I found out that the Army was about
ready to announce a new senior executive po-
sition, an assistant deputy Chief of Staff for
combat developments at TRADOC headquar-
ters. Having been in Walt Hollis’s office for
three years and observing the SESs up there,
you’re always saying to yourself, “I could do
that if I ever had the chance.”
So when this job became available and was
announced in open competition, I applied for
the job. Not in anyway thinking that I would
get it, but thinking that it’d be good experience
to go through the process. I then learned that
there were about 50 applicants, a couple of
them were sitting SESs, a couple of them were
retired general officers. Then I became abso-
lutely convinced that I would not get the job,
but said, “This’ll be good experience to go
through the application process.”
Meanwhile, being very happy at MITRE
and realizing that it’s okay if I didn’t get job, I’d
still have a good job at MITRE and I had good
work to do in the OR community.
BILL DUNN: But you didn’t move down
to Fort Monroe.
VERN BETTENCOURT: No. I was a geo-
graphic bachelor for a year.
BILL DUNN: How’d that work out? I
mean, as far as wear and tear on you.
VERN BETTENCOURT: Actually, it wasn’t
that bad. There’s a TRADOC shuttle that goes
from Fort Belvoir down to Langley Air Force
Base and then comes back. At the time it was
doing that maybe three or four times a day. So
I could go down on Monday morning and
come back Friday afternoon, lugging paper-
work all the way. It worked pretty well.
The difficulty was at the time—and this is
in the mid 1990s, is that there was a freeze in
government hiring for the most part. So my
wife who had been in government contracting
out there and had left the government and now
was trying to come back in—there were no jobs
for her in the Tidewater area. So that was a
draw to come back to Washington, D.C.
But I do need to say that when I went in to
interview with General Lehowicz for the posi-
tion, one of the comments that he did make
was, “I’m honored to be interviewing a Past
President of MORS for the position here in our
organization.” So even there, MORS was a
great help in getting the position.
BOB SHELDON: So you spent a year
there?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Right. I spent a
year down there and then Walt Hollis called
and said that one of his SES positions had come
open, and he would like to transfer me from
TRADOC up into his office.
BOB SHELDON: What was your big
project that year at TRADOC?
VERN BETTENCOURT: One that I really
remember is a thing called a war fighting lens
analysis. What that was, or still is, is an effort to
integrate the requirements and priority of the
systems across all the battlefield operating sys-
tems. And to prioritize between trucks, Howit-
zers, tanks, command and control systems, et
cetera. How do you prioritize those require-
ments?
BOB SHELDON: You applied your OR
skills to that?
VERN BETTENCOURT: A lot of decision
analysis and subjective skills. As part of this
decision analysis, we brought in quantitative
analysis as part of the evidence that was con-
sidered by the panels that were doing a priori-
tization. We did a loose Saaty analytic hierar-
chy effort. We, in combat development, did a
lot of the prioritization of the work that
TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) per-
formed. Their budget came through us. So we
did some of the prioritization of what they were
doing.
BOB SHELDON: Did you work with Mike
Bauman?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Mike Bauman
was and is the Director of TRAC.
BOB SHELDON: How was that working
relationship? Did you travel to Fort Leaven-
worth a lot or bring his guys to Fort Monroe?
VERN BETTENCOURT: TRAC has an of-
fice at Fort Monroe and we worked a lot with
his office there. He had a couple GS15s at Fort
Monroe, because he was not only the director of
TRAC, but he was also the deputy Chief of Staff
for studies and analysis at TRADOC. So his
deputy Chief of Staff office was there at Fort
Monroe. So we worked with that office. He did
a lot of studies for us, and we ended up going
out to Fort Leavenworth and White Sands, also.
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That worked very well since we were both
ORSAs.
BOB SHELDON: Moving back to the Pen-
tagon to work for Walt Hollis, what was that
job?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Fundamentally
the same job I had as a Lieutenant Colonel. As
we discussed earlier, he divided up his work-
load fairly evenly between the colonels and the
SESs. I had aviation. I had M&S. I had analytic
techniques. And I had what today we would
call analytic human capital. Much to my cha-
grin, I did not have field artillery. We had a
field artillery uniformed officer and he kept
field artillery.
BOB SHELDON: Was that a new position?
VERN BETTENCOURT: No. It was an ex-
isting position. But the subject matter would
switch around based on the experience of the
analysts in the office.
BOB SHELDON: What analytical issues
did you oversee?
VERN BETTENCOURT: One of the major
issues that we had was how to do what I’ll call
Mission Area Analysis, which was somewhat
akin to War Fighting Lens Analysis. How do
you do more than analyze something in the
functional stovepipe in which it exists? How do
you look at the value of the system across a
family of systems, and then across an army of
systems? General Ed Anderson who was the
Army Assistant DCSOPS, was asking us those
questions. How can your analysts help me pri-
oritize across battlefield mission areas? We in
the Army had been doing a thing called value
added analysis—CAA had been involved in
that. General Anderson had us link together
some analysis starting at AMSAA with a sys-
tem modeling analysis, then TRAC for tactical
and CAA provided the Army-wide analysis.
BOB SHELDON: So it’s not like the Total
Army Analysis.
VERN BETTENCOURT: Actually we used
a lot of the techniques and the data and results
from that, but it was focused on combat effec-
tiveness in a certain area. The area was attrition
of combat vehicles but it was attrition by all
means. Mines, artillery, air, Army air, and di-
rect fire; rather than just in the stovepipes.
BOB SHELDON: Did your perspective of
M&S and analysis change going back to Walt
Hollis’s office, as compared to what it was
when you were at TRADOC?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I would say only
as far as a better appreciation of what the po-
litical civilian decision makers needed out of
the analysis. As I look back, as a younger mil-
itary officer, I was more focused on the techni-
cal and military correctness of the analysis. As
an SES, I’m still interested in that, but now I’m
more attuned to, “What’s the purpose of this
analysis?” And, “What’s the ultimate use that
the civilian decision makers are going to
make of this analysis?” As I think of it, more
emphasis on definition of the problem, and
structuring of the analysis to provide what it
was that the decision makers would need out
of it. If there were any difference, I think that
would be it.
BOB SHELDON: In your relationship with
the analytic agencies and CAA and TRAC, as
you worked for Walt, did you work directly
with those folks?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. That was
one of the great joys of that job. In that office
you would see across all of the analytic agen-
cies in the Army, and the FFRDCs, and OSD
and the Joint Staff, and industry. So you would
get an appreciation for techniques and exper-
tise throughout all of those different elements
of the analytic agency.
Not so much with the Navy, but with Air
Force Studies and Analysis. Walt’s office
formed a great partnership with Jim Bexfield,
Clayton Thomas and Jackie Henningsen in per-
forming analysis and incorporating Air Force
effects into Army analysis, and vice versa.
Of course, during the QDR period, that
friendship was tested but never broken. That
was one of the great joys of working in Walt’s
office. Harkening back to my days as an in-
structor at West Point, every once in a while
Walt would ask me to actually do analysis, and
that was a lot of fun, also, to do quick turn-
around, back-of-the-envelope analysis.
Working with the agencies, I know one of
our challenges in Walt’s office was an attack on
AMSAA; maybe the Army should contract it
out, disband it. We mustered all of the analytic
agencies in support of AMSAA because it was,
and is, the source of Army data. You can’t do
analysis in the Army without AMSAA and its
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data, and it was also the source of most of the
physical algorithms in our models. Those were
some exciting times when we were defending
AMSAA, which we successfully did.
BOB SHELDON: How did you defend it?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We gathered all
of the other Army analytic agencies and train-
ing agencies, which also use AMSAA data. We
brought them into the Army leadership and
said, “Perhaps you don’t understand what
AMSAA does.” We had testimonials from all
these other agencies that said, “Without AMSAA
we won’t be able to do this, this, and this.” It’s the
foundation of the Army analytic community and
the Army training community and a lot of the test
and evaluation work.
BILL DUNN: One of the things that’s hap-
pened to AMSAA is they’ve taken away all
their military personnel except one. Do you
think that’s had an impact?
VERN BETTENCOURT: It undoubtedly
has had an impact. I think AMSAA ought to
have at least a couple of military in each of its
divisions to throw some mud on the numbers
that it’s producing. Civilians do an excellent
job, but I think it would be better if it had some
junior military up there, in addition to the one
they’ve got.
BOB SHELDON: From your vantage point
working for Walt and overlooking the analytic
capabilities of the Army, how do you feel about
the capabilities of the Army to do analysis?
From TRAC, Monroe, CAA. How do you feel
that’s evolved over your thirty years of involve-
ment in the Army analytic community?
VERN BETTENCOURT: The Army ana-
lytic community does excellent work. I think
it’s the flagship of the service analytic commu-
nities. My perception and experience is the
other services also do excellent analysis. Theirs
is contracted out more than what the Army
contracts out, because we have our in-house
analytic agencies.
One of the things that the Army needs to
work on in its analytic structure is that right
now—my experience is two years out of date—
but I think it’s in large part—I’ll call it a project-
based analysis. What was called a COEA is now
called an AOA. If there’s a system going
through the acquisition process, we do excel-
lent analysis in response to that acquisition pro-
cess. CAA has a broader mission and does
some broader periodic analysis, looking at a
Total Army Analysis, et cetera. I think we could
do a better job, Seth Bonder used to call it a
warm base of analysis. Analysis that is there
and ready to go when we’ve got an issue. Then
we don’t have to generate a large analytic pro-
cess to answer an issue. In other words, we’ve
got analysts that are keeping data and models
warm by doing analysis that’s not caused by
the acquisition process.
The new challenge of the JCIDS process
may help us in that arena. Theoretically, you
should be doing analysis identifying capabili-
ties and capability gaps prior to the start of the
acquisition process that then narrows the anal-
ysis down to looking at specific systems or
capabilities. That more broad analysis is the
type of thing that I’m talking about. That says
here’s the Army fighting the war. Now what
are its capability gaps? Right now I don’t think
we have the systemic impetus to do that type of
analysis. Nor do we have the resources to do it
in the analytic community. I’ve been a propo-
nent of what I call activity-based costing of
systems. If the system is going to go through
the acquisition process, I believe it ought to pay
for its analysis. The resources that we put to-
wards the analytic community ought to go to-
wards these more general and broad analyses
that are developing the capabilities and re-
quirements for a system. There’s studies out at
the Defense Acquisition University that say
that in the first 20% of expenditure of resources
for a system, 80% of the system is defined. You
have defined 80% of the overall eventual ex-
penses of that system. So that first 20% of effort
is extremely important to get it right. If you
don’t, and we’ve had experiences—things like
Sergeant York in the Army—if you don’t get it
right, you’re going to pay a huge cost later on
down the road.
I don’t think our system of analysis in the
Army right now is geared towards that. I think
it’s a resource issue. The analysts would like to
do it. It’s just where do they get the resources to
do that, if they’ve got the demand of the acqui-
sition process that they currently have.
BOB SHELDON: You talk about the ana-
lysts and the M&S tools. How do you feel those
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have evolved over the thirty years that you’ve
been in the business?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I can continu-
ously draw parallels between that area and the
area I find myself in now with this CIO busi-
ness, in IT and information management. First
of all, the Army has a good set of models. I
think that there is work to be done, and I would
have said this before I was over here in the CIO
world—but one of the weakest areas is the
modeling of command and control. There’s a
lot of work to be done there, and it’s a very
tough area because it’s not a physical area. I
can’t write a command and control equation
equivalent to one that says this is ballistic tra-
jectory of a tank gun or this is the mobility
coefficient of a tank. There’s not a physical,
mathematical equation to be written. So it’s a
very tough area.
I think that the battle lab interactive mod-
eling is getting us well down the road in this
area. That’s one of the best approaches. But that
being said, I think that we do have a good set of
models, particularly for our weapons systems
and transportation systems. One of our tenden-
cies that we’ve got to get away from, and I
think we’re getting away from what I call the
big bang theory of modeling, in lieu of what I
call the wing-walking theory of modeling.
The wing-walking theorist says, “I’ve got a
model that works. I see that I need to move to
another modeling capability. But I’m not going
to let go of this model that works. I’m going to
try and improve it, so that I can keep hold of it,
and grab hold of the objective that I want.” I
think that more times than not, we don’t do
that. We go to the big bang theorist who says,
“I’ve got this model that works, but it’s not
object oriented.” Maybe it’s not on the right
platform. Maybe it’s not service oriented, archi-
tecture based. So I’m going to discard that, and
I’m going to start from scratch, and build a new
model. Our experience is that’s absolutely the
wrong way to do it. There are a lot of model
acronyms in that graveyard, both in the Army,
the other services, and DOD and Joint Staff.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s get to your transi-
tion from Walt’s office to the G6.
VERN BETTENCOURT: There was a five-
year stopping off point in G3. I came to Walt’s
office in 1985 and 1995, and I left in 1988 and
1998. That’s easy to remember. So Walt says
this year it’s about time for me to come back
again, because it’s 2005. (Laughing) When I was
in his office, one of the areas that I had was
Army M&S. In about the 1996 timeframe we
formed the Army M&S Office (AMSO), that
was headed by an 0-6. The other services’ M&S
offices had SESs and of course, DMSO had an
SES. The Army had M&S domains, and each of
the domain leads was either a general officer or
an SES, and then you had this 0-6 trying to deal
with them, and enforce standards. You also had
a bunch of unruly GS15s over in the Army M&S
offices that needed leadership. One of which
was Bill Dunn (conducting this interview). So
there was desire to get an SES over there. There
had been a manpower survey in G3. And they
were going to draw down a couple 0-6s in G3.
Walt, at the time, didn’t have 0-6s in his office,
and he wanted a colonel in his office. G3
needed to get rid of a colonel, and G3 wanted
the SES in AMSO, which was assigned to G3. So
we worked a trade where an 0-6 and a GS15
went to Walt’s office, and the SES position went
to G3. So that’s how I moved over to G3. By the
way, the G3 at the time was General Tom Bur-
nette who was a West Point, Georgia Tech,
ORSA, and also ORSA/computer science. He
got a double Master’s Degree at Georgia Tech.
He was anxious to get an ORSA SES over there
in G3, so I went to work for him. I worked for
a year as the head of AMSO. Then John Riente,
who was the Technical Director at G3, retired. I
moved up to replace him as initially the Tech-
nical Director, and then that job changed to
Director of Analysis, and CIO, which was more
descriptive of what the technical director was
actually doing. I had that job for four years, so
five years total in G3.
BILL DUNN: When you were director of
analysis, that was a time of big change in the
DOD and Department of Army. We had new
programs like Army Transformation and Ob-
jective Force. General Shinseki said he wanted
to rapidly field a Brigade Combat Team. And
then ultimately the beginning of the Army Fu-
ture Combat Systems, and so with these new
programs, which were unparalleled from pre-
viously, and with you being director of analy-
sis, what new analytical approaches did you
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see needed to be done? And what did you
direct?
VERN BETTENCOURT: One of the main
jobs of the director of analysis in G3 was to
assign analysis tasks for the Army. The G3 is
the Army tasker. My office determined what
analysis tasks would be done by TRADOC, by
TRAC, Army Material Command, i.e., AMSAA,
or the Army staff, i.e., CAA. The majority of it
was tasked out of G3. One of our efforts was to
ensure that our taskings were very clear. We
talked earlier about developing the problem
statement, and the scope of analysis, et cetera.
We would spend a lot of time making sure the
taskings defined what it was the analytic agen-
cies needed to do. Not how; but what.
Another thing that took a lot of our effort
was, there was a lot of change going on at the
time. So we made a lot of effort to make sure
that we were integrated across G3 to anticipate
any analysis that would be required, rather
than react to OSD saying, “You’re not going to
pass this milestone because you don’t have
analysis to support it.”
So we tried to anticipate and define the
analysis that would be required. For example,
one issue was the Army’s operational response
in Kosovo. The press and other agencies al-
luded to the fact that the Army couldn’t deploy
fast enough to Kosovo. We went to CAA and
commissioned a transportation analysis that
looked at what had to be moved, what were the
assets to move it, and what were the ports, if
you will, the airport assets both at the origin
and at the destination.
CAA developed a great set of graphs that
showed that the issue was not so much the unit,
or even the aircraft available to move the unit,
but it was what was being allocated at the far
end of the line as far as ramp space for carrying
Army units. That went all the way up to the
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army. And
they used that in their discussions of how the
Army was able to move in that situation. Be
that as it may, the perception was out there on
the beltway that the Army was heavy and slow
and couldn’t respond, which was not the case.
Another issue was the Army’s need for a
medium weight element. The G3 convened a
very senior group of GOs and SESs with a work
group of O-6s below them. I think it was called
the Army Transformation Working Group.
They worked for four or five months to help
define what we need to do, if we’re going to
transform the Army based upon the perception
and the reality of what happened in Kosovo
into the new combat environment that we were
finding ourselves.
The first time that the head of the O-6
working group briefed the G3, he had a list of
ten inhibitors to getting his job done. The num-
ber one inhibitor was, “I’ve got too many ana-
lysts involved.” (Laughing) His attitude was,
they’re going to slow me down and I don’t
need them to design a new Army.
When the final product was presented six
months later, Major General Bob St. Onge who
was the Director of Strategy, made the unsolic-
ited comment that had we not had the analysts
involved, we never could have accomplished
what we did. So that made us feel pretty good
about the work that we’d done.
That was a lot of quick reaction effort.
Looking at a synergy of analysis across the
Army. By that I mean there was a lot of trans-
portation and theater level effectiveness, com-
bat effectiveness work, done by CAA. Trans-
portation. Strategic responsiveness. How far
can we get, how fast? How much combat ser-
vice support do we need once we get there?
How are we going to get that? A lot of work
done by AMSAA on new or otherwise cur-
rently available, but not in the Army inventory,
systems. AMSAA looked at some of the me-
dium weight fighting vehicles around the
world and some of the medium weight can-
nons, et cetera. So AMSAA was doing a lot of
that system level physical analysis.
Then TRAC, taking the AMSAA results—
this sounds like the work that that General
Anderson had us doing a couple years before.
TRAC took the performance analysis that
AMSAA had done, and cranked that into their
tactical and operational level models, and
looked at how would these systems perform in
units. A lot of that was done in models. A lot of
it was done in I’ll call it battle lab interactive
analysis. Where we were looking at different
types of combat, somewhat similar to what’s
going on now. Peacekeeping. One of the things
that General Shinseki wanted was a full spec-
trum unit. In other words, I could go all the
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way from high level combat down to peace-
keeping and stability operations. How did
these different systems and unit organizations
function across the whole spectrum?
When you got down to the bottom end of
that spectrum, stability ops and peacekeeping,
there weren’t a lot of good combat models for
that. So TRAC was doing a lot of war gaming
work in that area. We did all of that with a
bunch of different alternatives, and we brought
that into this group and I think that was a great
help to the group. General St. Onge said he
couldn’t have done it without us. So I think that
was one of the main initiatives in the new ways
of doing analysis.
I don’t know how new it is, but it was a
new way of combining all sorts of different
types of analysis techniques, stitching together
or synchronizing all of the Army analytic agen-
cies, which is what we did in G3.
Then the Army launched off and General
Shinseki wanted a responsive acquisition to get
that medium weight unit. This was still pre-9/
11, but he wanted this quickly.
BOB SHELDON: Was this about the time
General Shinseki dedicated the new CAA facil-
ity at Fort Belvoir?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Actually this was
after that, because CAA was at Fort Belvoir
when we were doing this work. We did some of
the war gaming at Fort Belvoir at their new
facility. Shinseki had a lot of urgency to get a
new combat vehicle and equip into the force as
rapidly as we could. So we did a lot of work
with OSD PA&E and OSD ATL, to go through
a very abbreviated acquisition process, to ac-
quire what is now the Stryker vehicle.
The main thing that the analysts at OSD
were looking for was what’s the combat value
of a unit with this vehicle? We looked at the
testers to evaluate the vehicle, because we were
purchasing “off the shelf”, with minimum
modifications. It wasn’t a case of designing a
vehicle. We knew that in order to meet the
Army’s timelines, it had to be an off-the-shelf
purchase. But the real issue for OSD was, “Do
we really want that kind of vehicle?” It was a
combination of work by AMSAA, TRAC, and
CAA to justify that, “Yes, we need that vehi-
cle.” One of the turning points was the TRAC
analysis, but then feeding that into war games
out of CAA, in which we had OSD analysts
participate. We used several different scenarios
around the world that came out of the threat
community. As we tried to deploy different
configurations of Army units to these potential
hot spots, the OSD analysts could begin to see
the value of this vehicle. I think that played a
large role in getting the Stryker vehicle adopted
into the Army.
There’s also a lot of work by AMSAA on
the survivability of that vehicle, because it’s not
an Abram’s tank. It’s not a Bradley. It’s a
wheeled vehicle, medium weight. So AMSAA
did a lot of work on how many of those things
could you put in a C-130 and how far could it
fly once you got them in there.
There was a lot of work across the Army
community, but in less than eighteen months
from the time we said we need a vehicle like
that until the Strykers were rolling onto Fort
Lewis, we were able to do that in less than
eighteen months, and short-circuited a lot of
issues. We spent a lot of time with the OSD
analysts making sure we understood their is-
sues, involving them in our analysis so that
they could see where we were getting our re-
sults.
The next phase of that was the Future Com-
bat Systems (FCS). There was less urgency in
that, because we have the Strykers coming in.
Then we had to define, if we don’t buy off-the-
shelf, if we developed systems, what should
they look like? What would those capabilities
be, and what do we need? Again we had to
stitch together a lot of analysis. Walt Hollis said
it was the most difficult analysis the Army ever
did. We were able to get through milestone A
and B with OSD. But FCS is still progressing
along under development. It’s spinning out
technologies into the evolving current force. So
it’s a vital program in the Army right now.
BOB SHELDON: When Walt Hollis called
it the most difficult analysis the Army has un-
dertaken, how would you qualify the difficul-
ties?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I think in at least
three dimensions. Number one, people begin to
realize the importance of the network, and net
centricity to the FCS system of systems. That
was difficult because here we are again trying
to model and analyze command and control,
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and now a force whose doctrine is net centric-
ity. I would argue that the new doctrine of the
U.S. military is net centricity. So that’s a preem-
inent attribute of that force. And the modeling
of that and the analysis to that is very impor-
tant. So that was difficulty number one.
Difficulty number two is that FCS is a sys-
tem of systems. We call it 1811. There’s 18
platforms, plus one is the soldier, plus one is
the network. So there’s in effect 20 systems that
comprise a system of systems. All of those are
variables requiring analysis.
Number three is—it’s a full spectrum force.
So it has to be able to fight under conditions of
high level combat across the spectrum to low
level, including medium, low intensity conflict,
and finally peacekeeping and stability opera-
tions, deterrence. Across that entire spectrum,
around the world where we were deployed.
We had to selectively pick scenarios to use in
analyzing this force. And oh, by the way, what
did a unit look like? How many levels of com-
mand were there? I mean, much of this was
uncertain.
It was a totally new force with new doc-
trine, potential new organizations, et cetera. So
all of that had to be looked at and it consumed
the Army analytical community for about two
years.
BOB SHELDON: Did that require substan-
tial modifications to your models and simula-
tions to capture those things?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes. The most
substantial were in the areas of the network. By
varying the model parameters on the platform,
you could portray the platforms. They go so
fast, they have this radar cross-section. They
have this ballistic cross-section. They have this
lethality. They have this vulnerability. You
could vary these parameters in existent models
and do an adequate job of portraying the plat-
forms. One of the most difficult issues was the
network. We got at that by focusing the Fort
Knox battle lab on being an FCS battle lab. That
wasn’t its title, but effectively that’s what it
was. They went into great effort to adapt mod-
els and analytic techniques, i.e., interactive war
gaming to be able to portray the network.
On some of the exercises, we would go
down there and there’d be a big, white 18-
wheeler outside the battle lab with a bunch of
models and analysts from Fort Monmouth that
would act as a surrogate for the network. These
were connected via DIS and HLA into the reg-
ular combat model so that you get a higher
fidelity into the network.
Another challenge was modeling the dis-
mounted soldier. The future combat force is
very intense in its combat formations with in-
fantry. As we recognized the need and the type
of operations that we think we’re going to be in,
and are currently in, it requires a lot more in-
fantry. A lot more dismounted. We want them
to be much more capable. You could envision
every dismounted soldier has a small computer
each having and generating his own situational
awareness. So we had to upgrade our models to
be able to handle them and portray their value.
BILL DUNN: MORS has tried to answer
the call on a few of these things, like net cen-
tricity. We had a special meeting on that. Do
you think that MORS needs to do more work in
this area?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I just read an ar-
ticle last night and, in fact, brought it in to scan
and send it out to several people, some of
which are my analysis friends. This article was
written by the OSD Office of Force Transforma-
tion. They are doing some studies, and they’ve
briefed me on some of their studies, to try and
establish the value of net centricity. I really
think that MORS should go to school on what
they’re doing, and ought to look at what could
MORS contribute to the methodology that’s be-
ing used in these studies, and to the tools that
are being used in these studies.
This goes back to when I was the President
of MORS and Desert Storm had just taken
place. While we’re still in the fight, and will be
for probably a few more years, we’re in a net
centric intense dismounted fight. We ought to
go to school on that. What does it mean? What
are the metrics? What are the tools we need to
analyze it? To model it, et cetera. I think MORS
could be of great value to step into that briar
patch and look at it.
Several MORS members are doing that.
We’ve got Army analysts over there. The Cen-
ter for Naval Analyses has analysts over there
periodically. The Air Force has some. Rand is
doing some work in that area. Marines too. A
lot of lessons learned. This is clearly relevant, if
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not in Iraq but elsewhere, for years and years to
come, I believe we’re going to be in this fight.
So it would behoove MORS to take a look at
this and see where they could help. I would say
that even if I were still in G3 and not over here
in CIO. That belief is one of the reasons that I
came over here. I thought that this was the
center of action for a while, on the way we’re
going to fight in the future.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s talk about your
transition from G3 to CIO. How did that come
about?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I ought to cover
one other event that’s not exactly MORS re-
lated, but certainly significant. During my time
in G3 was the attack on the Pentagon. My other
duty in G3 was the CIO of G3. As I said, Gen-
eral Tom Burnette, while at Georgia Tech got
dual degrees in OR and computer science. So
when he brought me over, he gave me the CIO
job and he tried to persuade me that it was
really an outgrowth of being an analyst and
modeler that you’d also assume the CIO role.
I’m not sure I ever accepted that, but he argued
passionately in that regard. He didn’t have to
argue. He had three stars and I had the equiv-
alent of one, so it was a short argument.
Certainly a significant emotional event was
the attack on the Pentagon. The Navy opera-
tions center got hit hard. I’m not sure of the
numbers, but I think the hardest hit was the
Army staff. Certainly when we gathered the
next day in what is now the Information Tech-
nology Agency, which is one of the offices that
works for us on the technical side—to assess
the Pentagon network and where were the out-
ages and the destruction, it was very clear that
the Army was the hardest hit among the staffs.
And within the Army, the G1 and the G3 were
the hardest hit. Our entire network in G3 was
destroyed. So that became a very real 24/7
month-long effort to reconstitute our lost capa-
bilities.
We reconstituted. We had all our users
back online in less than 48 hours, and they were
all throughout the Washington, D.C. area, but
we got them up.
BOB SHELDON: Did you lose personnel,
too?
VERN BETTENCOURT: G3 lost two per-
sonnel. The real hit in the Army was the Office
of Administrative Assistant. He lost 40-some-
thing people, because the aircraft came in right
in the middle of their offices. And Army G1 lost
quite a few people.
The other staffs, G8 lost two. We lost two.
CIO I don’t think lost anybody. They were in
the inner ring, so they lost their offices, but they
didn’t lose people.
That was a tremendous effort by both con-
tractors and government personnel to com-
pletely bring everything thing back up again.
But it was quite an experience, and quite a bit of
cooperation with the other Services and the
Army. Particularly since we were the worst hit,
a lot of cooperation in providing us personnel
and assets to get back up again. One of the
things that certainly did was raise our aware-
ness of Continuity of Operations (COOP) and
the requirements for that.
In 2003 the deputy CIO Dave Borland de-
cided to retire. General Boutelle who was the
incoming CIO, looked at the operations in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. He wanted an SES who was
operationally oriented as his deputy, wanted
somebody who had been in the building and
knew the building, how the building worked,
as his deputy.
He and Dave Borland looked around and
somehow decided that I might fit that. Also I
had been a thorn in their side on the Army CIO
executive board as the G3 CIO. (Laughing) Gen-
eral Boutelle had been a two-star during the
9/11 effort, and had been down there almost
every day with us when I was representing G3
in the reconstitution of the Pentagon network. I
was also on a MITRE Red Team that evaluated
his creation of the Central Technical Support
Facility when he was a PM. So they began to
recruit me to come into this position. It was
very difficult to leave the ORSA world and
come over here, and I did turn them down
several times.
But they were persistent, and I think two
things really caused me to come here. One was
that I was convinced that the most important
thing that we were working on, looking at so-
ciety, looking at the military, was network and
information technology. And I thought, for the
foreseeable future, that would certainly be one
of the most important technologies that we
were working with. And one of the most im-
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portant capabilities. I think that the net centric
force has validated that thought. This is an
extremely important technology.
For one, for the abilities and capabilities
that it gives the force. For not much investment
if we bring in COTS products, because we can
bring in COTS products onto the military sys-
tem and provide a network. We’ve demon-
strated that.
Second, culturally and socially if you look
at Generation X and Y as they come up, this is
how they think it operates. If you ask us, “What
was said about so-and-so or what are the im-
portant points of the topic?” We’ll turn to our
bookshelf or our file cabinet and we’ll look for
a piece of paper. If you ask Generation X or Y,
who are our soldiers and emerging civilian
leaders, they turn to Google. They get on the
network. I mean, my daughters do it all the
time. And so do the younger officers and sol-
diers. This is second nature to them. So it was
obvious that was going to be a key piece of our
military in the future.
The other thing that attracted me here was
the ability to be the second in command of the
office that was going to bring us into that fu-
ture. Those are the two challenges I think that
drove me to say, “Okay, I’ll let go of the ORSA
world and come over here.” But I don’t think
I’ve completely let go of the ORSA world. I
mean there is a need and we play in that role
for analysis of command and control. We’re
looking with TRAC at M&S tools for command
and control. And what do we need to do? What
are the capability gaps there? Where do we
need to improve? Build the old C2 MAWG—
Modeling and Analysis Working Group. Try-
ing to resurrect that.
BILL DUNN: Did you develop some ana-
lytical capability with G6 or were you relying
on the Army analytical community to do your
analysis?
VERN BETTENCOURT: We’re relying on
the Army analytic community. We did a stra-
tegic reorganization in G6 and I put that on the
plate of one of our two-stars. And he has a
person that is dedicated part-time to analysis
and M&S. Also our technical director, Dr. Ed
Siomacco, is working with Kent Pickett and
Mike Bauman and Pam Blechinger on what do
we need—what are the capability gaps in M&S
for command and control.
My longer term goal is to eventually get an
ORSA on the staff here, or at least access to an
ORSA somewhere who is dedicated to com-
mand and control M&S and analysis. Cur-
rently, we use the Army analytical community,
as well as Rand and MITRE in those roles. Also
we have some of our contractors like Booz
Allen and SAIC that we use in those roles.
Now we have to consider a new type of
analysis, for me, called business case analysis.
As we look at changes to the Army network,
not just on the tactical side, but on the institu-
tional side, and in the post camps and stations.
As we go through that, we try to do business
case analysis that says, “Is this justified, and
what’s the best approach to server consolida-
tion, single directors of information manage-
ment at a Post?”
There is analysis that’s done. Gartner—
which is pretty much an IT analysis house—
that’s well known, does work for us and does
business case analysis. In fact, they came in and
said we’re going to brief you on a study, and
they briefed me from an IT CIO perspective.
And I, being an ORSA, was expecting to hear a
study briefing. So it went kind of rough until I
walked them around the walls here and said,
“Do you see these ORSA plaques? These mean
something. And when you tell me you’re going
to brief me on a study, I expect problem state-
ment, assumptions, alternatives, methodolo-
gies, tools. The ORSA process.” So now they’ve
come back and briefed me on that. They’ve
been in here for a total of about four hours. And
it turns out they did a very valid study, once
they briefed in ORSA and not a CIO. So there’s
a whole new branch of analysis that I’m inter-
acting with now that I wasn’t over in G3.
BOB SHELDON: I see you have a couple
of Civil War prints and memorabilia around
here. What’s your interest in the Civil War? Did
that rub off from E.B. Vandiver?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Sort of. When we
left California and I came back to Virginia, one
of the personal goals I had was to do battlefield
tours, and battlefield reconnaissance and learn
more about the Civil War. Since going to the
military academy, I’ve been very interested in
military history. So I said, “It’s pretty stupid to
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be living here in Virginia, and not take advan-
tage of what’s right here in the local area.”
Also, growing up in California, we really
didn’t study the Civil War. It was a distant
thing out there. So I came back with that goal,
and then discovered that Van had this passion.
So yes, we do go out together. We enroll in
Northern Virginia Community College Civil
War courses every year and go out on battle-
field tours with them.
BOB SHELDON: What did you learn from
your study of history that might apply to your
work?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Clearly the ef-
fects of terrain. That’s one of the great things
about being able to visit the battlefields. The
effects of terrain. The effects of communications
and lack thereof in the Civil War battles. And
the whole time dimension in the Civil War
battles, and how communications and speed of
platforms, i.e., horses and feet, versus motor-
ized and armored platforms. The whole pace
and scope of battles. And how truly small in
space the Civil War battles were. Yet how vi-
cious they were. And the inability of the com-
manders to analyze what was going on and to
understand the effects of some of the weapons
that they had—the new weapons coming in
versus the formations they were using, and the
terrible toll that that caused in the battles.
BOB SHELDON: They could have used a
good CIO back then.
VERN BETTENCOURT: CIO and also op-
erational analysts that said, “Dummy, these
bullets travel pretty straight and fast now that
we’ve rifled the bores. You maybe ought to get
down and disperse.” (Laughing)
BILL DUNN: And if they would have had
better Intel.
VERN BETTENCOURT: Yes, that’s very
true. The Army Signal Corps started in the Civil
War right out here in Manassas. So that’s an-
other important piece.
BOB SHELDON: You’re out of the 49
mainstream now. But if you were giving advice
to young military analysts, what would you tell
them?
VERN BETTENCOURT: I would say if
you’re going to do military OR, the distinction
there is the military piece. So if you’re a military
officer, you need to do everything you can to
learn the organizations, and weapons, and sys-
tems, and doctrine, and tactics of your branch
of the service and how it all fits into the joint
picture. That’s what you bring to the analysis as
a military officer, primarily. And if you bring
great technical analytic credentials and exper-
tise, all the better. But what I believe we’re
looking to you for is to bring the military reality
and validity to what we’re trying to do.
You need to concentrate on that as you go
through your career. Warriors march to the
sound of the guns. Analysts ought to go to the
sound of the guns to do their work as much as
they can.
If you’re a civilian, government civilian or
contractor civilian doing military analysis, to
some lesser degree, you need to learn how the
military service or services you’re supporting
operate and what they do on the battlefield and
their capabilities. But I think there’s more em-
phasis on the technical expertise that you
would have in your ORSA techniques.
As we’ve gone into operations other than
high or mid-level mid-intensity combats, oper-
ations that we now find ourselves in, the ability
to bring other analytic techniques that are not
standard military, M&S set piece models—cre-
ate the model, get the results—but bring in
other things like interactive war gaming. Like
tabletop war gaming. Like business case anal-
ysis. Saaty analytic hierarchy techniques. All
these techniques that aren’t normally associ-
ated with military OR that we were doing back
in the 1960s and 70s and 80s. I think the ability
to apply these techniques to these new prob-
lems that we’ve got is something that the civil-
ian analyst, the contractor, and the military an-
alyst, ought to work on.
We look to the analysts to bring scientific
methodology and scientific rigor, and unim-
peachable ethics to the analysis of problems.
And to point out to the decision makers what
the decision makers’ alternatives are, and what
the pros and cons and risks of each of those
alternatives are. That’s what we’re looking at
the analysts to do. So the use of the scientific
methodology, the OR process, absolute ethics
in analysis are things that I think are vitally
important for the military OR analyst.
One of the true values of MORS is that it is
a joint body. Two great values—at least for the
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government—of MORS is it can conduct clas-
sified meanings, and secondly, it’s a no penalty
joint forum, where people who normally might
not talk to each other and bare their souls, feel
free to do so. In today’s world, which is very
much a joint world, the analyst needs to think
and analyze jointly. So another piece of advice
that I would give to the young analyst is to
make sure you don’t get stove-piped in your
service and your battlefield capability. Make
sure that as you’re doing your analysis, that
you’re doing a broad-based analysis, consider-
ing the contributions that the other services and
agencies can bring to your fight.
BILL DUNN: You were fortunate in that
you got to work with and for people like Wil-
bur Payne and Walt Hollis and E. B. Vandiver
and Mike Bauman. How did that help you?
VERN BETTENCOURT: Not to be patron-
izing but it was absolutely invaluable. I try and
remember as I go through my daily actions the
care that I think those people took—maybe not
so much Mike Bauman, who is younger than
me (Laughing)—in developing a young analyst.
I think that they clearly saw that—in the Ar-
my’s current terminology, the development of
the bench was of great importance. So I try and
remember that as I work with the young civil-
ians and officers that come into the CIO shop,
and out in the Signal Corps. All of them were
very understanding of mistakes, at least one
mistake per topic, and were willing to take that
into stride and help develop young analysts. I
think that’s been invaluable, and I would hope
that I continue to repay that debt as I go
through the “senior phase” of my career.
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